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ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents a study of the crisis over Cyprus that lasted many years and 
concluded with the bloody events of the summer of 1974. The intervention of the military 
dictatorship from Greece and the subsequent Turkish invasion may have been the 
culmination of this crisis, but this thesis will show, contrarily to common perceptions, the 
causes of the crisis were not primarily a function of ethnic hatred. 
This thesis concludes that the reasons for the conflict are found mainly in the 
actions of the international powers and the consequences of the Cold war. Based on these 
findings the thesis explains the unsuccessful efforts of the United Nation to find a 
compromise and a solution that is accepted by the people of Cyprus.  
Lastly, the thesis outlines a plan that could be approved by all Cypriots and could 
offer unity and stability in Cyprus, based on the mandates and the protection of 
international organizations.  
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Figure 1.   Map of Cyprus1 
 
In the summer of 1974, extremist paramilitary Greek-Cypriots who favored 
unification of Cyprus with Greece after the declared independence of Cyprus in 1960, 
supported by the Greek dictatorship in Greece, abolished the democratic principles of the 
island and aroused anti-Turkish feelings through a military coup. In response Turkey, 
alleging as its reason Turkish-Cypriots’ security, invaded and captured the northern part 
of the island. The Turkish invasion may have given an end to the rising internal conflict, 
but not an end to the problems that created and caused this conflict as well.  
The 1974 conflict in Cyprus was only the apogee of a multisided problem with a 
long history predictive of the sequence of dramatic incidents that will be discussed in this 
thesis. The following chapters will show how a chain of international and domestic 
events and political and social factors led to a crisis in Cyprus. The crisis went from 
simply internal agitation to disruption of the constitutional government to a Turkish 
invasion that caused many thousands of deaths and changed forever the distribution of 
                                                 
1 Kypros-net Inc., “The World of Cyprus,” 
http://kypros.org/Occupied_Cyprus/images/maps/cyprus_1974_657_bg.jpg. (May 2007). 
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the island’s populations. All those factors combined or even any one of them could be the 
basis of a case study that would interpret, justify, or criticize their contribution to the 
1974 crisis. No effort to explain the conflict or to provide a viable and credible future 
solution, however, should claim that the crisis had only one main cause. 
There are many studies, articles, and books that contain serious and persuasive 
attempts to provide an appropriate solution to what is often described as “the Cyprus 
problem.” And many state leaders, armies, and diplomatic services, whether they 
participated in the historic events surrounding the crisis or not, have found it necessary in 
detailed studies to apologize for or justify their involvement, direct or indirect. While all 
of them are involved in shaping the future for Cyprus, however, prospects for a better 
future came to rest in the hands of the United Nations, which took control after the 
Turkish invasion and tried to create a formula for reuniting the divided state. But despite 
many years and a long process of study, work, and negotiations they did not reach a 
successful conclusion, leaving many leaders, scholars, and people in general with 
questions and doubts that any solution will ever be found. The culmination of this failure 
was the Greek Cypriot community’s rejection of UN Secretary General Kofi Anan’s fifth 
plan in April 2004.  
This thesis tries to identify the reasons for the ultimate UN failure. It challenges 
the dominant argument in the literature, which considers ethnic rivalry as the major cause 
of the conflict. Thus, far, the UN’s efforts have been guided by a conventional “ethnic 
conflict” rhetoric that claimed there was Greco-Turkish rivalry between both the various 
communities and the state leaders and that was used to justify foreign involvement. Thus, 
the UN efforts retained separatism on the island and accepted the status quo created by 
the Turkish invasion. No attempt was made to change that.    
In Chapters III and IV, the thesis attempts to demonstrate that the conflict was not 
produced by ethnic rivalry, but rather by foreign political factors. Against that 
background, therefore, Chapter V comprises a harsh critique of the UN practices in 
regard to the so-called Cyprus problem. Thus, essentially, this thesis challenges, first, the 
bodies of power and decision-making that consider the Cyprus crisis an extension of an 
historic Greco-Turkish rivalry and focus only on the ethnic dimension, as did the creators 
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of the disastrous 1960 Constitution. Second, the thesis challenges those who exploit the 
ethnic dimension in the region as a means to gain political, economic, and strategic 
benefits. And, third, the thesis challenges those who claim or pretend to establish an 
independent democratic state while at the same time keeping it subject to foreign 
interests.  
Over the centuries, the peculiar symbiosis of two such different communities as 
the Greek and Turkish Cypriots – different in their origins, traditions, history, and 
language – was a natural breeding ground for mutual mistrust and prejudice. That was 
greatly exacerbated by the London-Zurich agreement and call for independence in 1960. 
There is no doubt that the Cyprus issue has an “ethnic” element that creates “ethnic” 
rivalry and “ethnic” losses. However, despite the mix of unfriendly ethnicities in the 
conflict, we will show that it is primarily external factions that used ethnicity as a means 
to achieve their goals that were responsible for the evolution of events. Whatever the 
causes of this tragic situation, the victims are unquestionably the Cypriot people. They 
suffered first from the indifference of the international community toward settling the 
uprising, and afterward from its unsuccessful and mercenary intervention. In regard to the 
Cyprus question, the international community proved incapable both of following its own 
norms and of resolving complicated ethno-political problems. 
The thesis makes an important contribution to the long-standing debate about the 
Cyprus problem. It examines, in respect to both the pre-invasion and the post-invasion 
period, the main question: whether any UN resolution to the problem would be viable. In 
the conclusion, the thesis presents a possible general model of a united state that would 
be acceptable to both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. The model is founded on the 
concept of a free, independent state that would be based on a free, independent economy. 
However, any resolution to the Cyprus issue will prove inadequate, if not impossible, if it 
is not preserved and enforced by strong, decisive organizations such as the UN, NATO, 




The analysis that follows examines the ethno-national reality in Cyprus and the 
international and domestic political, economic, strategic, and social factors that have 
contributed to the conflict. To provide an objective context, we begin with a brief 




II. HISTORICAL REVIEW 
A. THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE CRISIS UNTIL THE INVASION 
This chapter reviews the main historical events of Cyprus’s history, which 
influenced the demography and determined the cultural distinctiveness of the island. This 
history, will trace the sensitivities that could allow the divergences of the island to flare 
into conflict and so justify the dramatic days of summer of 1974. 
After Sardinia and Sicily, Cyprus is the largest island in the Mediterranean Sea. It 
is located 40 miles south of Turkey, 500 miles southeast of Greece, and 70 miles west of 
the Middle East. Because it lies in the crossroads of three continents, Europe, Asia, and 
Africa, and is wealthy in natural beauty and resources, throughout history, Cyprus has 
been the target of would-be conquerors.  
The Greeks settled Cyprus 5,000 years ago and comprise the majority of its 
population. Over the years, Hittites, Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, Romans, Byzantines, 
Ottomans, and British have ruled Cyprus, known as the Island of Venus,2 always taking 
from her civilizations and her cultural and material treasures. In 1571, the Ottoman 
Empire added Cyprus to its conquests, marking the beginning of a doleful chapter of her 
history. Three centuries later, in 1878, just before the British took control, the Turkish 
community was 18 percent of the total population of 600,000, while 80 percent was 
Greek, and 2 percent Armenian, Latin, and Hebrew. The British agreed to maintain the 
Ottoman dominance over the island and to continue their subordination tax to the sublime 
Porte. However, in 1914, because the Ottomans had cooperated with the Germans during 
the First World War, the British annexed Cyprus and, in 1925, the Treaty of Lausanne 
made it an official British colony. What is strange is that the Greeks subsequently denied 
having offered Cyprus to the British during the war in an effort to gain their support in a 
war in which the Greeks eventually participated. 
                                                 
2 According to Greek mythology, Venus (or Aphrodite, which means “to break surface in the foam of 
the sea”) was born in the foam of the shallow waters of Cyprus and was the most beautiful Goddess of the 
Olympic Gods, just as Cyprus is one of the most beautiful islands of the Mediterranean Sea.  
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Since then, relations between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities 
have been in crisis because of the Greek Cypriots’ demands for self-determination 
through unification of the island with their motherland, Greece. Notably, however, the 
agitations of 1931 did not involve the indifferent Turkish Cypriot community. They were 
directed by the Greek Cypriots at the British administration and succeeded in abolishing 
its legislative council and its associated decrees. In 1941, the British secretary of state 
offered to return Cyprus to the Greeks by the end of World War II – although keeping 
British bases there – in recognition of the Greeks’ contribution in fighting the Axis.3 But 
the Ministry of Colonies reacted negatively to this idea, fearing a domino effect involving 
other British colonies. Nonetheless, the great idea of enosis, unification with Greece, was 
implanted deep in the minds of the Greek Cypriots and would not be easily uprooted. In 
any case, the Greek government4 was not eager to fight for that unification, which would 
mean contradicting the Great Powers’ policies in Greece.  
In 1950, Bishop Makarios, who embodied the Greek Cypriots’ hope for enosis, 
was elected Archbishop of Cyprus. At the same time, the United States took control, 
giving new hope to the Greek side, which was now homogeneous. In 1951, Greece and 
Turkey became members of the North Atlantic Alliance.  
In 1954, a new rapprochement to the British from Greece’s Prime Minister 
Papagos that requested Cyprus’s annexation was denied by the Ministry of Colonies due 
to Cyprus’s great strategic and military importance to Great Britain. The first Greeks to 
react to the denial were Archbishop Makarios and a hard-line colonel named Grivas. 
During the Greek resistance against the Germans, Grivas had inspired the creation of a 
national organization of Cypriot fighters, a resistance team known as the National 
Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston), or EOKA, 
                                                 
3 According to Richard Clogg, A Short History of Modern Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986), 171, Anthony Eden (the British secretary of state) “was afraid the Germans might score a 
propaganda triumph by capturing the island and formally ceding it to Greece.” It seems strange that the 
Germans would give the island to Greece, which had defended the members of the Axis from 1940 (the 
Italians) and 1941 (the Germans). 
4 In regard to the annexed territories, the primary national target for early post–WWII Greece was the 
acquisition of north Epirus, in southern Albania, which was dominated by the dominant Greek ethnics and 
had been freed after the Greco-Italian war. 
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dedicated to freeing Cyprus from the British and uniting it with Greece. Who could have 
predicted that this struggle would last twenty years and would comprise the bloodiest 
pages of Cypriot history?  
In respect to Great Britain’s interests on the island, things became more 
complicated after Britain’s loss of Suez in 1954 and the end of the French conflict with 
Egypt. Realizing that it would be very difficult to protect their interests against the Greek 
Cypriots’ struggle for enosis5 and the increasing opposition to the British presence, they 
exploited the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot factions, which were indifferent, if not without 
interests and rights at the time. Turkey’s interests were represented in the partitioning of 
Cyprus, a separation of the two communities into separate territories that would either be 
unified eventually with their motherlands, or, through a natural evolution process, 
become two independent, self-administrative states. 
Turkey’s national disillusionment in this regard soon became transformed to a 
nationalistic passion that in 1955 resulted in violent actions against its wealthy and 
powerful Greek minority, a total of 100,000 people in Istanbul. They had been granted 
permission to live there by the 1929 Treaty of Lausanne. The withdrawal of Greek 
officers from the NATO headquarters at Izmir which followed the violence reaffirmed 
the breakdown in bilateral relations. After an ambiguous American intervention, King 
Paul of Greece appointed Kostantinos Karamanlis6 prime minister, a change he hoped 
would benefit Cyprus against the Menderez government in Turkey.  
But in light of the disillusionment of both Great Britain and Turkey, the Greek 
position had shifted to one of absolute and rigid Greek objectives. And neither Great 
Britain nor Turkey was disposed to be receptive to the Greek and Greek Cypriot 
majority’s demands for self-determination, for that would deprive them of key 
geopolitical and strategic benefits. Thus, the British stance hardened. And when Makarios 
                                                 
5 The resistance forces falsely claimed and the Greek-Cypriot community believed that the much 
desired enosis posited persecution of the British bases from the island. Unification with Greece would only 
be admissible and effective if the bases were maintained, since Britain was a NATO ally and, moreover, 
there were American bases scattered around Greece. 
6 Prime Minister Karamanlis, who was known for his American sympathies, supported his country’s 
dependence on and connection to the Western world. Throughout his career he served those ideas. 
 8
was banished from the island in 1956, the violent reactions organized by EOKA resulted 
in casualties on both sides. In that same year, a draft constitution calling for an 
independent and autonomous Cyprus was rejected by the Greek government, which 
hoped to gain the desired unification from the United Nations. It believed that any 
“partnership” in the administration of Cyprus was conducive to the partition of the island. 
However, after Makarios’ return in 1958, this “partnership” became negotiable for the 
Greeks because of the bishop’s attitude of goodwill and spirit of conciliation toward the 
idea of independence.  
In February 1959, the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey, Karamanlis and 
Menderez, met in Zurich to discuss Cyprus independence and eventually signed the 
Zurich-London agreement. Though the agreement provided independence for Cyprus, it 
did not take into sufficient consideration the real situation and the dysfunctional 
constitution, which made Britain, Greece, and Turkey7 responsible for the constitution’s 
security and operability. Under the terms of the agreement, Greece would maintain a 
guard of 950 men in Cyprus, and Turkey 650 men. Both the Greek Cypriot president, 
Archbishop Makarios, and the Turkish Cypriot vice president, Dr. Kiutsuk, would have a 
veto right. But the complicated distribution of power among the subordinate bodies of the 
administration8 promised a conflicted and insecure future for the island. Despite the 
popular archbishop’s election as president in December 1959, the general response of the  
 
                                                 
7 The treaty gave permission for each of the members equally to intervene in the island, exerting its 
legal right in order to protect its people. The question evoked by this is, How indiscriminant can this right 
be, since Cyprus does not consist of the two nations responsible for securing its protection and integrity. 
8 The Turkish representation of the public sector positions covered almost one third of the total, 
instead of the 18 percent of its population evoking reactions from the Greek side. The veto capability of the 
two presidency positions made difficult, if not impossible, the decision-making on bilateral issues depriving 
the region of co-evolution and homogenization of the communities which proved to the be most important 
for peaceful living. Moreover, the Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Defense – the most important 
Ministries – were given to Turks, while the decision-making of the Council of Ministers was adjusted to an 
absolute majority. The House of Representatives, which exercised the legislative power, consisted of 35 
Greeks and 15 Turkish-Cypriots. Judiciary power and the armed and security forces represented an unequal 
percentage of the population, which gave increased power to the Turkish-Cypriots, but would have 
eliminated their presence on the island if it were smaller. Dinko Dinkov and Stoyan Stoyanov, “The Cyprus 





Greek Cypriots to the new situation was dispirited. Subsequent events proved even more 
problematic, as EOKA declared it would continue the struggle to “defend history’s 
rights,” causing a rupture between their leader, Colonel Grivas, and Makarios. 
In late 1963, President Makarios presented Vice President Kiutsuk with thirteen 
amendments to the so-called “unworkable” constitution, including some articles 
characterized as “unalterable.” When the Turkish side refused to accept the amendments,9 
the Turkish cabinet ministers were forced to resign, as well as those in high 
administrative positions in the public services and all the civil servants. According to the 
Greek side, this move had been directed by Turkey and was aimed at creating unbearable 
tension among members of the current government over the proposed creation of a 
separate, autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration. The Turks had a different 
interpretation of those events. According to them, Makarios dismissed all the ministers 
and discharged the Turkish Cypriot representatives at the UN in order to sever the 
channels of communication and representation to the Turkish Cypriot community.10 And 
these were only the beginning skirmishes. On 21 December 1963, Turkish planes flew 
over Cyprus, and, in January 1964, the American president, Lyndon Johnson, sent 
General Lemnitger (SACEUR) to advise the Greeks and the Turks in reaching a 
compromise, and thus, avoid any invasion. 
The next crisis occurred in the summer of 1964 when, after President Johnson’s 
intervention and severe admonition of Turkey’s President Inonu rejecting any possibility 
of an invasion, Turkish decisiveness was greatly diminished. Nonetheless, in August, 
serious conflicts, mainly in the suburban villages, severely undermined, perhaps forever, 
the possibility of peace and security in the island. The Turkish civilians congregated into 
small zones and the Turkish air force took action in revenge. Though Makarios was 
willing to compromise in respect to Cyprus’s independence and to solve its problems in a 
bilateral fashion, the Greek government tried to stifle his ambitions and take control of 
the situation. It sent Grivas back to Cyprus. But the opportunity for the Greek interests to 
                                                 
9 Archbishop Makarios ignored the High Court’s verdict reaching the anti-constitutionality of the 
amendments.  
10 Dinkov and Stoyanov, “The Cyprus Problem,” 171. 
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annex Cyprus was lost when Greece’s President, George Papandreou, rejected the U.S. 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s plan, which provided for the unification of Cyprus 
with Greece and the continued maintaining of Turkish bases and the creation of Turkish 
cantons on the island.11 
During the next three years, Turkey weighed America’s decisiveness in deterring 
an invasion, while preparing militarily and exacerbating relations between the two 
communities and against Turkish civilians so as to have an excuse for intervention. At the 
time, Makarios was trying to keep control of the Greek Cypriot community, against 
Grivas’s concerted attempts to conscript them and to terrorize the Turkish Cypriots and 
eventually unify Cyprus with Greece. The only thing Grivas managed to do, however, 
was to separate the Greek Cypriot community into two camps and awaken the nationalist 
fervor of the Turkish Cypriots. From the beginning of the crisis, they were vulnerable and 
alone, divided even from their motherland’s political and military objectives.  
Throughout this period, Greece was entangled in an effort to define its democratic 
identity through the alternating of often contrary but similarly unstable parties, which 
were unsuccessful in fulfilling their promise in the country’s governance. The three-year 
instability concluded with a coup on 21 April 1967. A group of Greek colonels, who were 
well prepared and well informed, surprised everyone by using the army to capture the 
most important posts of the administration and take control of the country.12 What was 
most remarkable, they succeeded by following a NATO plan for dealing with such 
internal situations. They established a dictatorship, imposed military rule, abolished the 
                                                 
11 Clogg, Short History of Modern Greece, 180–182. The plan included annexation of the Greek island 
Castelorizo by the Turks. Today, this incidence is considered a great loss, but then it seemed impossible.  
According to Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig, The American Conspiracy: America, Espionage, and 
Turkish Invasion (London-New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), 113, the Acheson plan wasn’t as 
cessionary as described by Clogg. It included “a wide range of proposals, such as partition, confederation, 
and resettlement, but mainly provided “double enosis,” separating the two communities and unifying both 
with their motherlands, making everyone happy and the Americans even more, preventing possible 
independence that might risk possibilities of Soviet influence and getting Makarios a new Castro.” 
12 The colonels justified their action as a need to prevent a forthcoming communist coup d'etat, 
without submitting any proof for this accusation. However, it was widely known that they wanted to defend 
themselves in advance for their dismissal from the army after the forthcoming and almost sure victory of 
the central party at the elections of the following May. Other motives can be found, such as the low morale 
of the officers due to low wages and the continuous intrigues and extravagance of the public wealth by the 
politicians (Clogg, Short History of Modern Greece, 183–184). 
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political parties, cancelled significant articles of the constitution, created military courts 
and exiled thousands of “leftist” ideologists to unoccupied islands. But the most 
significant loss for the Greeks after democracy itself was international support in dealing 
with the problems of the Greece/Turkey/Cyprus triangle because of the diplomatic 
mutilation of the country.  
The worldwide outcry over the punishments and the abolishment of important 
freedoms isolated Greece from the international community. Thus, in December 1969, 
the Council of Europe almost suspended Greece from the council. Strangely, the only 
supporter of the Greek military coup was the American government, a factor that resulted 
in a number of conspiracy theories regarding the direct or indirect participation of an 
American faction in the coup’s establishment and maintenance. While the degree of U.S. 
intervention is difficult to prove, the connivance of the Greek regime was remarkable. It 
would have been nearly impossible to organize without some knowledge and at least 
implicit acceptance by the U.S. secret service.13  
In September of 1967, the new Turkish approach to the possibility of invasion 
was again stopped by President Johnson.14 However, the United States not only remained 
the only weapons supplier for the Colonels but also tried to maintain access to the region 
through the already established U.S. military bases. Thus, the Pentagon did everything it 
                                                 
13 According to O’Malley and Craig, The American Conspiracy, not only the American secret services 
but also the government and State Department were absolutely informed about the situation and actually 
organized very carefully the military intervention, using Colonel Papadopoulos, who was fully connected 
with the CIA and the hub of the Greek secret services (KYP) and was known for his nationalistic past and 
his authoritarian ideas. The use of a military coup would negatively influence Cyprus’s balance, legalizing 
the Turkish invasion and making a “fall guy” of Greek anger. This theory alone does not answer the many 
questions discussed in subsequent chapters, however.  According to Laurence Stern, in The Wrong Horse: 
The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy (New York Times Books, 1977), the 
intervention, especially that of the American embassy in Greece, was determined to encourage the military 
coup in order to prevent the rise of leftists and further Soviet interference in the part of Greece under 
American control. It was simply proof that the choice of the “wrong horse” leads the horseman to an 
undesired battle, a saying derived from Clausewitz..  Richard Clogg and G. Yannopoulos accept the idea of 
an American intervention through a military coup, but that plan concerned the king’s participation and his 
security and it ultimately was rejected (Greece Under Military Rule: United States Policy in Post-War 
Greece, New York: Basic Books, 1972). 
14 Thanos Veremis, The History of Greek-Turkish relations, 1453–2003, Chapter 6, 117. 
 12
could to keep a good relationship with the Greek colonels.15 Whatever the truth about the 
American participation in the military dictatorship in Greece, the Greek inability to 
control crises and its tendency to have nationalistic, prejudiced, and inexperienced 
leaders would prove fatal for the people of both Cypriot communities. This disadvantage 
became even greater when, under President Johnson’s order, the 10,000 Greek troops that 
were transferred to the island after the Treaty of Zurich- London withdrew from Cyprus, 
leaving the island defenseless.16 
Meanwhile, two attempts organized by King Konstantinos to bring down the 
conspirators, one in 1967 with the army’s support and one in 1973 with the navy’s 
contribution, found them still both informed and prepared. These failures caused the king 
to flee the country. 
In 1972, in an effort to increase the defense capabilities of the island, Makarios 
ordered a supply of Czech missiles,17 declaring by this his disengagement from the Greek 
military regime and its objectives for enosis, which he believed would change Cyprus to 
a province-protectorate or a resort for the members of the coup. Since Czechoslovakia, 
which had been under Soviet control since 1968, and many others wanted Makarios to 
negotiate Cyprus’s acceptance into the Eastern bloc, there could be no better excuse for 
the Western alliance to work for his deposition. 
                                                 
15 According to Clogg, A Short History of Modern Greece, the United States, through President Nixon, 
in January 1972, professed the need of keeping good relations with Greece because of her geopolitical 
importance to the defense of Israel. At the same time, several American ministers paraded from Athens to 
present President Nixon’s warm wishes and succor to the regime for its faithfulness to the NATO 
mandates.   
16 EOKA’s leader Grivas had returned to the island in 1964, and in November 1967 he attacked a 
Turkish village aiming to drive the Turkish minority out of Cyprus and make uniting with Greece even 
easier (Clogg, A Short History of Modern Greece, 194). 
17 “Makarios played with fire,” Kissinger said in his Years of Upheaval (Boston-Toronto: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1982, 1189) about Makarios’s decision to install missiles. Cyprus for the Americans 
stood as a bad contingency of becoming the “Cuba of the Mediterranean.”   
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The end of the coup, on 25 November 1973, came in the same way it had been 
established.18 A combination of armed forces put in power once again a military leader 
and established a new dictatorship, leaving unfulfilled the spirit of democracy for which 
the young students at the Technical University had tirelessly fought.  
The new coup’s objectives concerning the Cyprus issue were the same as their 
predecessors. For them, also, Makarios was an obstacle to the plans for unification with 
Greece, and Grivas worked hard under their orders to replace Makarios with someone 
who would endorse enosis. EOKA, reborn and transmuted into the EOKA B terrorist 
team in 1971, tried several times to kill the archbishop, but was unsuccessful. 
The recent discovery of petroleum in the Aegean Sea once again evoked hostility 
between Greece and Turkey, bringing closer the possibility of conflict. The increasing 
pressure on the Makarios regime peaked on 15 July, when the Greek Cypriot National 
Guard, instigated by the Ioannidis’19 coup in Athens, openly confronted Makarios’s 
forces, in an attempt to capture or even kill him. Makarios’s forces were defeated, but he 
fled to England in a British plane.20 His escape marks the final countdown for Cyprus’s 
integrity. The leadership was taken over by Sampson, an EOKA ex-activist known to the 
Turks for his brutality and deadly hatred of them demonstrated by his operations in the 
mountainous villages. 
The Turkish forces saw the leadership takeover as a green light to declare their 
intention to intervene according to the rights provided by the Zurich-London Treaty and 
the security necessary for the Turkish community. Immediately, both Greece and Turkey 
                                                 
18 The incident at the Technical University in the center of Athens, where a great number of students 
were enclosed to express opposition to the regime (according to Clogg, 34 of them died from the army’s 
display of force) is even now a point of ambiguity. According to Clogg, the incident whipped up the 
civilians and ruined the coup. According to eye-witnesses, nobody died in the almost empty university and 
the coup that had already lost its power. It was only a matter of time before it broke down by itself. 
19 Ioannidis was the Chief of the Police during the seven year coup of the Colonels and led the second 
coup in Greece until the first Turkish invasion. 
20 Makarios has been called the most ambiguous person in Hellenic history since Alkiviades, the 
leader of the Athenian allying forces in the Peloponnesian wars, who defected first to the opponent 
Spartans and later to the Persians leading a crusade against the Greek city-states. History hasn’t dealt justly 
or blamed Alkiviades for his actions, to betray his country and fight for the enemy.  Indeed, there are many 
today who consider Makarios a hero for resisting the Western interests for the good of Cyprus. But many 
more call him a traitor, accusing him of calling on the Turks to intervene and defend his power and the 
security or the Turkish population. However, the call to the Turks has never been proven.  
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ordered a military mobilization. But the Greek effort proved inefficient due to internal 
opposition among the officers and the disorganizing influence that both dictatorships had 
had on the armed forces.21 
B. ATTILA I: THE FIRST INVASION 
Early in the morning of 20 July 1974, the Turkish forces invaded Cyprus in the 
region of Kerynia, landing more than 6,000 soldiers and hundreds of tanks and trucks 
from thirty landing ships, accompanied by a great number of destroyers. The operation 
became known as “Attila 1.”22 Turkish paratroops joined the 650 Turkish-Cypriot 
fighters and sought to reach the northern part of Nicosia, so as to establish a secure road 
from Kerynia to the capital, and thus, create a zone that would enclose the Turkish 
Cypriot population. The Turkish via Turkish Prime Minister Bullet Ecevit justified the 
invasion as a defense against the prior Greek invasion, intended to protect both Cypriot 
communities and to expel Sampson’s Greek-Cypriot junta. To increase his defense 
capability, Sampson had ordered tanks to be moved and freed the 10,000 loyalists he had 
previously imprisoned.23 Nonetheless, resistance against the Turkish forces was almost 
nonexistent. 
The Turkish invasion caused reactions involving interested countries’ forces. The 
British redirected ships from the Atlantic and Mediterranean to the area and flew 
commandos to the Akrotiri headland in an effort to protect the 17,000 British citizens on 
                                                 
21 Only four of the twelve divisions were at war strength and these were based in northern Greece and 
near Athens. The mobilization took two days to be completed and was conducted mainly to protect the 
northeast borders and the islands in case of a simultaneous offensive (O’Malley and Craig, The American 
Conspiracy, 188–189). 
22 Around 450 A.C., Attila, the brutal and catastrophic leader of the Huns, was destroying everything 
in his path. He acted in Balkans undefeated by the Byzantines who had to pay large amounts of gold as a 
“freedom taxation,” but after he directed his fierce troops toward the west and was defeated, he returned to 
the Hunan realm in central Europe.  
23 There are strange stories about the strong resistance of the Greek troops (O’Malley and Craig, The 
American Conspiracy, 188–189; Clogg, A Short History of Modern Greece, 199). O’Malley and Craig say 
that no plans were taken from the Greek National Guard when Turkish troops captured radars and that 
many Greek submarines and airplanes were recalled before reaching the shores of Kerynia. Clogg refers to 
the refusal of high-positioned officers, pretending inability, to obey Ioannidis’s orders to attack Turkey. 
Today, Greek-Cypriots ask why, in 2000, the UN stopped the Soviet missiles, such as the S-300 missiles, 
from Czechoslovakia that were never installed in Cyprus, and why, in 1967, the Greek division was 
recalled, gutting the defense of the island.  On a guided tour along the “Green Line” in 1999, I personally 
heard a Greek-Cypriot officer claiming that they seven times occupied and seven times were ordered to 
retreat from to an important strategic point which finally was offered to the Turkish side rising questions of 
organized betrayal.  
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the island and the strategic interests that their bases offered after falsely waiting for the 
Americans to deter the Turks from invading. The British threatened the Turks not to 
injure any British citizen or damage geopolitical possession, but they had to repeat it 
several times before the Turkish ships let them embark with 500 foreign evacuees. Egypt 
and Syria also placed their armies in readiness. The American force consisted of an 
aircraft carrier and six destroyers carrying 1,300 Marines. The Soviets put seven airborne 
divisions on alert and sent ships from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. The 
concentration of so many forces could conclude to a dangerous escalation, causing 
Kissinger to contact Moscow and ask for neutrality so as to avoid a confrontation 
between the two superpowers.24  
After two days, the Turkish goal was accomplished, with its successful 
establishment of powers in Kerynia and its connection to the captured part of Nicosia, a 
region that included more than 60,000 of the Turkish population, thereby implementing a 
plan similar to an American contingency intervention. The Turkish casualties were high 
compared to the resistance they faced; however, that cannot be compared to the suffering 
the two communities felt and would continue to feel from those days. Many thousands of 
civilians died trying to escape the bombs and the fire, or abandoned their homes forever 
and went into hiding to escape the angry retaliations. Atrocities were committed by both 
sides, with no discrimination as to age or gender. Today, those are portrayed in museums, 
reminding us how brutal human nature can be when people act out of religious or 
nationalistic passions abetted by political and economic interests indifferent to the value 
of life. O’Malley and Ian Craig allege that Kissinger directed the escalation and also 
probably the invasion process,25 exploiting to an absolute degree the “one-man show” 
that the Watergate scandal offered him. But the forthcoming downfall of the dictatorship 
                                                 
24 Greek warships which were considered phantoms the last three days but meant Greece’s entering to 
war, raising Turkish flags passed through Turkish convoys approaching the shores of Cyprus and when the 
Turkish forces comprehended the situation they responded by sinking finally one and scrapping two other. 
The Turkish commanders when realized had happened were happy that they did not hit the British or 
American ones positioned nearby. O’Malley and Ian Craig in The American Conspiracy: America, 
Espionage and Turkish Invasion (187-193). 
25 “The Turks were astonished by Kissinger’s detailed knowledge of events on the ground of 
Cyprus”…Kissinger to Ecevit: “Your bridgehead is strengthened, your reinforcements are about to land on 
the island, and can continue to do so after the ceasefire” [O’Malley and Craig in The American 
Conspiracy: America, Espionage and Turkish Invasion (194)]. 
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in Greece might have brought the leftist party into power, imperiling his plans by adding 
a Soviet factor to the game. However, the Greek threat to Turkey was unacceptable to the 
United States, the primary arms provider of both the NATO allies. And Nixon’s 
prohibition to the contingency of war in the southeastern region of the alliance was 
absolute just as was Johnson’s effective pressure on the Turks in 1964 and 1967. 
Finally, on 23 July 1974, the coups in both Cyprus and Greece were replaced by a 
civilian rule having Clerides and Karamanlis, respectively, as their Prime Ministers, who 
were proposed and accepted because of their Western connections. The ceasefire that 
succeeded after three days of bombing and threats, however, proved ineffective for 
subsequent Turkish plans. 
C. ATTILA II: THE SECOND INVASION 
 
 
Figure 2.   Map of Cyprus during the first and second Turkish invasion.26  
 
On 13 and 14 August 1974, the Turkish forces began a second invasion, which 
extended to the east and west and captured the entirety of north Cyprus. Three hundred 
tanks with 40,000 soldiers headed toward the eastern and western cities, supported by 
thirty warships and covered by air protection. This force succeeded in conquering one 
                                                 
26 Henry Kissinger, The Years of Renewal New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999, 220. 
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third of the island, from the city of Lefka to the west to Famagusta in the east, passing 
through the northern part of Nicosia. When the Greek Cypriots began to lose their 
positions in Nicosia, the Turkish soldiers moved to encircle the city and take control of 
the airport, simultaneously blocking the exit of the British bases in Dhekelia. However, 
more than 24,000 civilians, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, thinking that the Turkish 
advance would stop outside the walls, entered the two British bases seeking protection. A 
significant Turkish power was detached from the fight over Famagusta and redirected to 
Dhekelia, threatening the future of the British base. This situation provoked the British 
administration in both Cyprus and Britain, which, threatened by the confrontation, put 
their forces on alert and took an offensive position. The Turks, faced with the British 
decision to protect their sovereignty at the base, pulled their forces back, thereby 
avoiding a conflict that would have encouraged Greece’s engagement in the war. Greece 
hesitated because of its isolation, and the difficulty involved in bringing together the parts 
of its army, scattered after the fall of the dictatorship, kept her away. 
In Athens, Karamanlis was infuriated. Four hours after the second invasion began, 
Greece was out of NATO’s alliance, which was useless in any case, since it could not, or 
did not want to, defend Greece’s sovereignty and rights. The Greek officers had already 
abandoned the NATO headquarters in Naples and Brussels. A great number of people 
gathered in the center of Athens around the American embassy, protesting “treason” and 
“murder,” aimed specifically at Kissinger’s manipulations. A similar uproar in the United 
States and all over Greece did not affect Greece’s reluctance to enter the war, a war that 
would ultimately cost the Greek Cypriots 16,000 casualties, 4,000 killed, and 1,619 who 
are still missing today.27  
The Turkish partition of Cyprus uprooted and forced 200,000 Greek Cypriots to 
the south and imprisoned 60,000 Turkish Cypriots there whose misfortune was not a 
matter of interest to or negotiations by the Turks. Later, under Turkish threats to expel the 
                                                 
27 The Turkish casualties are estimated to have been around 1,000; 800 are supposed missing. Both 
sides deny imprisoning people during the invasion. However, almost ten years after the invasion, pictures 
from Turkish prisons – illegally published by Turkish journalists – show many of those said to be missing. 
They were recognized by family members, which once again roused the anger of the Greek Cypriot 
community. 
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few remaining Greek Cypriots from the north to the south, the Turkish Cypriots were 
transferred north, thereby accomplishing the Turkish plan to change the population 
distribution of the island forever. 
A ceasefire was agreed to on 16 August, but only after American pressure on the 
increased Turkish disposition to continue south and capture nearly the whole island. 
Ecevit now declared he was ready to continue negotiations in Geneva with the advantage 
that the invasion, now an accomplished fact, gave him. At the same time, the Greeks 
blamed NATO for not intervening, for not providing a deterrent to the Turks, for not 
having pressed them for an agreement at the previous Geneva meeting on 8 August, for 
having blueprinted the partition of Cyprus (by the Pentagon and the CIA) back in 1967, 
and since, for having edited the contingency plan which provided exactly the same 
partition in the current situation.28 
The second invasion closed the book of blood in Cyprus’s history without, 
however, resolving the problems that created the conflict and without making the life of 
the people of both communities better. The historical review indicates the problematic 
environment that Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots lived in since the early years of 20th 
century, leaving unanswered, though, questions of why low scale street fights concluded 
to actions of terrorism by armed groups against civilians, to direct intervention of the 
Greek military coup and the Turkish invasion, undeterred from the international system 
for more than 14 years. 
This question is the focus of the following chapters starting with a review of 
theoretical approaches at the phenomena of ethno-nationalism, ethnic conflict, and the 
implementation of these theories in the Cypriot crisis, which comes in the next chapter.   
 
                                                 
28 Andreas Papandreou, according to O’Malley and Craig, The American Conspiracy, 216–221. 
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE AND THE 
ETHNONATIONAL REALITY 
This chapter addresses the theoretical aspect of the Cyprus conflict, through the 
definition of terms like ethnic conflict and ethno-nationalism, and through different 
schools of thoughts with respect to how these phenomena are related to the conflict in 
Cyprus. It also discusses the ethno-national character of Cyprus and evaluates the 
contribution of this character to the evolution of the crisis into conflict. This evaluation 
intends to distinguish the ethnic dimension of the Cypriot problem from the reasons that 
caused the conflict and argue that the conflict should not be considered to an ethnic 
conflict.    
In the literature related to the years of crisis, Cyprus is aptly characterized as an 
orphan with three midwives, Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain,29 because of the 
guardianship stipulated in the London-Zurich agreement. The way those countries 
interpreted and manipulated their assigned guardianship had a critical influence on future 
events because, from the very beginning, they served their own interests. Since the 
agreement benefited all three, more or less, it was expected and reasonable that they 
would not set aside controversy for the good of Cyprus. 
What was not reasonable, however, is that the agreement process did not include 
the country it was created for. Cyprus was completely absent from the negotiations that 
would resolve its problems. Apparently, the three guardian countries did not consider 
them Cyprus’s problems. In other words, Cyprus was treated merely as a physical or, 
more accurately, as a geographical entity. The negotiators paid no attention to Cyprus’s 
ethnonational distinctiveness. This raises the question, Why then did they not divide the 
island into three parts with each guardian country assigned one part, according to the 
affected population’s preference, strategic needs, economic perspective, and other related 
reasons?  
                                                 
29 Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Cyprus: International Law and the Prospects for 
Settlement, April 1991, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1991. 
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Since that apparently proved unfeasible, they began negotiations in London 
intending to ease the Greco-Turkish rivalry by appointing a British arbitrator and 
maintaining the British influence in the area. How mistaken their belief was – that the 
Cyprus crisis was an extension of Greco-Turkish rivalry – would eventually become 
obvious. The solution they subsequently reached, however, giving Cyprus its 
independence, seems to have been considered irrelevant to their initial negotiations, as 
does the substance of the negotiations, which, in effect, created an unstable and unreliable 
regime.  
Nonetheless, the London-Zurich agreement gave independence to more than half 
a million people and created a new state with a new constitution. It established 
institutions and public services and designated a president and a vice president to lead the 
newly created democracy. How difficult would it have been to invite them to also 
participate in the settlement? How paradoxical would it have been – if Greece, Turkey, 
and England had agreed – to create a democracy in consultation with the domestic leaders 
who understood the unique character of the region? The foreign powers not only denied 
the Cyprus leaders participation in the settlement, but also instigated a series of treaties 
that set limits on Cyprus’s independence, sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of the 
new republic. In addition, the foreign powers were granted the right to station military 
forces on Cyprus’s territory and interfere in its domestic affairs.30 
Some might argue that, since neither of the Cypriot communities, the Greek 
Cypriots or the Turkish Cypriots, wanted to negotiate or compromise, because both 
demanded all, it was right that an external and objective agent should decide their 
destiny. However, if the communities, that is, the general populace, could not 
compromise out of instinct and prejudice, their leaders could have. And the external 
powers might have convinced them to do so. In addition, any excuse by the three 
guarantors, Greece, Turkey, and Britain, that they were indirectly involved parties to the 
settlement because of historical, religious, tribal, or regional reasons was not sufficient to 
justify their exclusion of the Cypriots, the direct inheritors of those heavy legacies.  
                                                 
30 Joseph S. Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press 
Inc., 1997), 24. 
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This is especially true of Greece and Turkey, whose recent history demonstrated 
that, for both countries, terms such as nation and state coincide. No one expected them to 
be neutral partners. The continual changing of the border between Greece and Turkey and 
their common bloody history was evident in the rhetoric demanding that many external 
nationals be included inside the Cypriot state’s boundaries. That rhetoric, not 
surprisingly, created a syndrome of localism and aggressiveness, rather than one of “self-
determination” and “state formation.”31 It is important here to clarify that both of the 
communities in Cyprus wanted to be unified with their motherland and viewed that 
unification as an implicit process. Since the agreement in London specified a new state as 
the only solution,32 the negotiators should have invited Cypriot representatives to 
participate in the process.   
On the other hand, any new state, in order to legitimize its existence, must be 
approved by the international community. A self-determination process is not enough. 
The best example of this was the northern part of Cyprus, occupied by the Turkish 
invasion, which was never recognized as legal, and reeling between corruption and the 
absence of corruption. An agreement among Greece, Turkey, and Britain gave worldwide 
legality to the new state, Cyprus. Some years earlier, during the Greek Cypriots’ 
decolonization struggle, when the Turkish interests over the Turkish community were 
insignificant, the international community through the UN was not consistent in its 
treatment of any new formation which they thought would endanger the global balance. If 
there had been international support then, Cyprus would now be part of Greece. 
The international status quo was not just important before the independence of 
Cyprus. The years of crisis were affected by the Cold War atmosphere and the dangerous 
changes in the balance among the various sides. The small, independent island of Cyprus 
could not survive the ethnic tension derived from Greece and Turkey without a 
superpower’s intervention. Once the Cypriot president decided to pick a side to support, 
the conflict became generalized and took on a new dimension. Although the great nuclear 
                                                 
31 State formation demands a strong will expressed through a strong regime. Greece and Turkey had 
neither a strong democracy nor a strong dictatorship. Their limited and immature political ideologies could 
not create or protect the newly created, unstable Cypriot constitution. 
32 No case for any annexation was acceptable to all sides. 
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fear may had decreased after 1962, alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact were 
willing to allow the other to achieve further enlargement and recruitment. The Cypriot 
“estate” especially was appraised even higher due to its location at the intersection of 
three continents and in the vicinity of the Soviet Union, the Middle East, and the Suez 
Canal.  
A. ETHNONATIONALISM33 AS A POLITICAL PHENOMENON    
Ethnicity has been a factor in state-building since the emergence of modern 
Europe.34 Ethnic and multiethnic groups searching for self-determination, especially right 
after two catastrophic wars, created states that were investing in and cultivating national 
consciences. Eastern Europe, which mainly lagged behind, according to contemporary 
political state-building theories, institutionalized ethnic identities and religious mandates 
as basic principles of the new states. 
In the same way, Greece and Turkey rebuilt their post–WWII states within a 
framework of national integration. On the one hand, the Greeks, after successfully using 
their national instinct in the struggle against the Axis powers, were rewarded with 
territorial and population expansion. This enhanced the Greek appetite, despite the ethnic 
disunion35 of the 1946–49 civil war. Old Greeks were joining the enlarged state, bringing 
their fortunes, except those in Cyprus and North Epirus (South Albania).36 On the other 
hand, the Turks established Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s “New Turkey” in 1923 on a 
secular, religion-free national foundation. After WWII and Turkey’s hesitance to choose 
sides in the war, its loss of benefits when everyone else was sharing the gains of victory, 
awakened the nationalist imagination once again in regard to Turkey’s foreign policy. So 
by the end of WWII, both Greece and Turkey had established weak democracies with  
 
                                                 
33 “Ethno-nationalism” is a phenomenon based on feelings of nationalism but it is expressed by those 
seeking to establish or re-establish their own states” (Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International 
Politics, 5).  
34 Ibid., 4.  
35 The ethno-national conscience was responsible even for the civil war. The fight was characterized 
as being “more and less national.”  
36 The expansive ambitions for Albania and Cyprus seemed more feasible because the dreams of the 
old, lost countries in Istanbul and Minor Asia seemed now out of reach. 
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indistinct civil-military relations and a limited political power. More specifically, their 
religious and national principles consisted of the basic articles of their constitutions,37 
which served to preserve the uniqueness of their national goals.  
This same ethnonational construction was transferred to Cyprus, filling the 
communities there with hope for enosis, unification with Greece and Turkey, and, by that 
double unification, partition of the island, respectively. Those hopes were not the product 
of nationalism and hatred of the other, but rather a fear of being isolated and conquered 
by the other. For the Greek Cypriots, it was fear that the great distance from Greece was 
creating and the burden of Turkey’s proximity. For the Turkish Cypriots, it was fear of 
being absorbed into the island’s unification with Greece. 
The independence of 1960 gave a new and cohesive direction to both 
communities, challenging those who declared war because of national prejudice, but only 
until the motherlands renewed their interference in the island’s public life. The 
ethnonationalism of both Greece and Turkey was enhanced by the multiple dictatorships 
that captured the reins of their countries. Furthermore, “with the collapse of the political 
system and the eclipse of ideology which bound ethnically different people, old rivalries 
re-emerge and neighbors become again antagonists.”38 Those evolutions enhanced the 
politicization of the nationalistic ideology and widened the boundaries of the dispute. 
Then any interaction between domestic and internal factors just speeded up the conflict 
and closed the diplomatic path to compromise.  
The antipathetic relation between Greece and Turkey includes hundreds of 
controversies dating back hundreds of years, from Byzantium’s wane until the Greek 
revolutionary war for independence in 1821, many unsuccessful wars, and the 1897, 
1912–14, and 1919–23 wars. During the in-between periods, however, the coexisting 
populations showed a noticeable peaceful capability which tended to break down again 
only under ethno-political pressure. The feeling of separatism that always exists among  
 
                                                 
37 The basic articles have not yet changed, but the political orientations and their degree of maturity 
have.  
38 Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, 3. 
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different-race people and the centralism among same-race people inside their 
neighborhoods are not an index of disputing interaction, but of conciliating acceptance of 
variety. 
B. ETHNONATIONAL DISTINCTIVENESS IN CYPRUS 
It is wrong to think that the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus disagreed 
with what their motherlands as national entities were expressing. The Greek Cypriots’ 
and Turkish Cypriots’ stands were exactly like their fellow populations in Greece and 
Turkey. Furthermore, local character differences usually have to do with distance, 
making people from distant locations seem different. But what binds people strongly with 
their motherland is a shared ethnic identity, including language and religion. In the case 
of Cyprus, however, religion was mainly a social phenomenon whose influence in the 
crisis was insignificant because it did not promote important changes. The great ethno-
political changes in both motherlands were directly reflected in and magnified by the 
communities of the island.  
This enduring connection with Greece and Turkey favored separatism between 
the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and contributed to an eventual eruption in the eastern 
Mediterranean that could not be controlled by either Greece or Turkey alone. Our 
reference to the ethnonational elements is not intended to imply, however, that the crisis 
was a result of nationalism. The ethnic ties were preexistent and very important. 
However, the influence of domestic nationalism on the crisis was small compared to the 
“imported” nationalism and international interests. 
Ethnic ties did play a distinct and significant role in the national conscience of the 
Cypriots., and thus, they had to be taken into consideration by anyone who wanted to use 
those ties for their own purposes, or anyone who intends to study the unique 
physiognomy of the island for scientific reasons. In the following discussion, therefore, 
we will explore some of the significant features and causes of that Cypriot separatism.39 
First, even though Cyprus was an independent state after 1960, none of the 
involved parties considered it so. The Greek Cypriots were still fighting for enosis, and 
                                                 
39 Committee on Foreign Relations, Cyprus: International Law and the Prospects for Settlement, 28–
29. 
 25
the Turkish Cypriots, for partition. And both Turkey and Greece considered Cyprus as 
either an extension of their national borders or, better still, a distant province. Their 
rhetoric was echoed automatically by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot populations. In 
addition, in a display of their awareness of the Greek and Turkish position, the Cypriots 
flew the Greek and Turkish flags during their national celebrations instead of that of 
Cyprus. The national anthems were a point of segregation as well. In addition, education 
on the island was based on the educational system40 of the motherlands, and because 
there was no university on the island, students were leaving. As a result, during the years 
of crisis, there was no common national Cyprus-oriented aspiration, experience, or ethnic 
unanimity to bind the two communities together and help preserve Cyprus’s cohesion.       
A second important factor that undermined the foundation of Cyprus as an 
independent state was the demographics of the minorities. It is important to remember 
that the Turkish Cypriots comprised the biggest minority, one fifth, of the population, 
which automatically gave them more rights than the other minorities. This was the case 
not only on Cyprus but also in Greece and Turkey, where they comprised only 2 percent 
of those populations. Strong minorities can demand a share in a country’s opportunities 
like the rest of the population. And they recognize the strength that comprising a 
significant percentage gives them in influencing administrative and economic issues. On 
the other hand, to the majority, 20 percent is so much smaller than 50 percent that it is 
considered only minimal, or even nonexistent. Such demographic factors make the state 
formation process even harder, because institutions and principles are subject to 
negotiation. This was especially the case in Cyprus, where the Turkish Cypriots, 
                                                 
40 An educational system that promotes antagonism from both sides and teaches how bad the 
neighbors are. Remember the time when soccer and basketball teams from Greece and Turkey met in 
European leagues and the game became a battle between the young, even student, fans at the rows? Who 
teaches and perpetuates this violence? Probably school. 
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following Turkey’s recommendations, were more intransigent in discussions in their 
attempt to gain more than the Greek Cypriots.41  
As a solution then, a federal system with only two constituent parts seems 
dangerous, because federalism works better in a large, more diverse environment, where 
groupings vary from time to time, as in the United States, Australia, and Canada. When 
there are only two unequal constituents, the system tends to break down, as it did in 
Pakistan.42  
Another aspect that contributed to the distinctive ethnonational configuration in 
Cyprus was the presence of the UN. During the post-invasion period, the UN maintained 
peace in the island, but it did almost nothing to deter the corruption of the emerging state 
during the years of crisis. If the presence of the UN, which was more political than 
military, had been decisive and more of a deterrent in the three years preceding the 
invasion, the low-scale, ethnic-type street fights might have been prevented. However, no 
blame can be charged to the UN troops, since they were not prepared to fight against an 
army and deter the Turkish invasion. In any case, as we will attempt to show, the 
international political background of the crisis played a more catalytic role than the ethnic 
predisposition of the disputed communities.43  
C. WHY THE CONFLICT IN CYPRUS WAS NOT LIKE OTHER ETHNIC 
CONFLICTS 
The definition of the term “ethnic conflict” is very wide and includes many 
different types of intrastate conflicts. The variety of definitions, though, according to 
                                                 
41 State-building in Cyprus resembled the problematic state formation in Africa and the Middle East in 
the post–colonial period and in the Balkans and central Asia in the post– Cold War period. When the 
protecting power withdrew its interest from the colonial state, the inherited administration could not be run 
by the newly emerging state without an infrastructure, especially when asserted by varying strong parties. 
Similarly, the end of the Cold War left behind guns and uncontrolled power for the tribes and insurgents 
that helped a superpower keep the state aligned. The arbitrary construction of their boundaries by external 
powers, the lack of societal cohesion, their recent emergence into juridical statehood, and their stage of 
economic and political development … demonstrate the political, economic, and social characteristics of a 
weak state (Mohammed Ayoob, State Making, State Building, and State Failure, Chapter 9 in Turbulent 
Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict Washington D.C, United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 2001), 128. 
42 Ibid., 127. 
43 I insist that any type of ethnic confrontation in Cyprus was sporadic and just eased the international 
political manipulations of the facts. Wide-scale episodes and conflicts followed by ethnic cleansing like 
those in the former Yugoslav republics are, without fail, “ethnic conflicts.”  
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personal interpretations, can exclude the conflict in Cyprus from the ethnic type conflicts 
or include it into them. Again, this thesis argues that, even if the Cyprus crisis involved 
an ethnic controversy, the final result was configured by the intervention of foreign 
interests. This arguments parallels a popular debate among scholars, who distinguish 
theories ethnic conflict into two camps: “primordialists” and “instrumentalists”44. 
“Primordialists contend that ethnic identities have deep historical roots and change little 
over time,” leading to expectations that ethnic conflicts really are about ethnicity. 
“Instrumentalists contend that political elites play decisive role in constructing and 
shaping ethnic identities and that their actions are driven largely, if not entirely by their 
political and economic self-interests.” The effort to demonstrate the exclusion of the 
conflict in Cyprus from ethnic conflict is consistent with the instrumentalist approach it 
will suggest category of that solution to the problem that would disregard the ethnic 
rivalry and would invest Cyprus’s future in strong political and economic bonds of 
interdependence between the confronted communities.         
The conflict in Cyprus had a number of characteristics that distinguish it from 
other ethnic conflicts. These include such aspects as international political interests and 
inherent societal predispositions, both of which influenced a sequence of crisis events and 
affected their conclusion. At this point, before we examine each country’s contribution, 
one at a time, it is important to understand what made the ethnic conflict in Cyprus a 
special case and to examine whether it was even an actual ethnic conflict. To do this, 
from the many well-known international ethnic conflicts – the wars in Somalia, Bosnia, 
Lebanon, Chechnya, Congo, Rwanda, etc. – we chose the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavian republic because of its geographical and tribal similarity to Cyprus. 
Ethnic conflicts often involve a direct confrontation between an ethnic minority 
(or minorities) and a national army, even if the army has only recently been created, such 
as was the case in the former Yugoslavia. In Cyprus, before the invasion, there had been 
no collision between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot troops. Instead, the fights were 
                                                 
44 Michael E. Brown, Ethnic and Internal Conflicts: Causes and Implications Chapter 13 in Turbulent 
Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict (Washington D.C, United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 2001), 209. 
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indirect, aimed at civilians by terrorist groups. TMT from the Turkish side and EOKA B, 
the reformation of EOKA, – with the same leader and same fighters, but different tactics 
and targets – evolved, that is, from a revolutionary team working for self-determination 
into a terrorist group with hard nationalistic language, were unpredictable, inflamed by a 
spirit of revenge, and much disapproved of by the general public. During the days of the 
invasion, atrocities and acts of revenge were committed throughout the island by all 
sides. It was an actual war, which was different from the usual conflicts, even though it 
only lasted a few hours. 
In Cyprus at the time, there was no political cohesion that could be expressed as 
solidarity in a national fight, rather than simply support for Makarios’s attempts at a 
peaceful solution. Clerides and Vasiliou, the leaders of different Greek Cypriot parties, 
both disapproved of Makarios’s decisions and wanted him to withdraw, though for 
different reasons. Moreover, the leftists in both parts of Cyprus contested the national 
struggle. 
A few days before the Turkish invasion, a civil war arose between the Greek 
National Guard forces under Grivas, backed by a military coup in Greece, and the Greek 
Cypriot forces supporting President Makarios. More Greek Cypriots were killed during 
this civil war than by either the TMT (the Turkish military organization which was 
created to fight against the Greek-Cypriot revolutionary struggle) or during the Turkish 
invasion. More than 10,000 Greek Cypriots were imprisoned for ideological reasons for a 
few days, until the invasion, when they were freed to defend their country. However, the 
TMT fighters also murdered many Turkish Cypriots, who objected to their plans to 
resurrect Turkish nationalism and excise all Greek elements from their culture and 
traditions.45 This phenomenon may have been unique; it certainly does not fit the usual 
definition of an ethnic conflict. 
Another aspect that differentiates the Cyprus crisis from the war in Yugoslavia 
has to do with the duration of the war. It was not the total defeat of the Greek Cypriot 
defense that stopped the war, but rather the foreign, that is, American intervention (to be 
                                                 
45 Costas Yennaris, From the East (London & Bath: Elliot & Thompson, 1999), 141. 
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discussed more fully in the next chapter). Usually, ethnic conflicts, because of their 
sectarian basis which extends the time of the war, take some time to recover from. 
Furthermore, there were enough arms available in Cyprus and Greece to continue an 
ethnic struggle, but not a conspiracy or an orderly partition of the island. 
In ethnic conflicts, armies take control of the military action from the societies 
that have authorized and promoted the conflict. National hatreds and aversions turn 
diverse segments of a society into aggressive groups – raised either by conscription or by 
a “vote of confidence” – that then reciprocate in turn to confrontational challenges. The 
terror exerted toward the Turks and the Greeks by EOKA B and the TMT, respectively, 
did not evoke respect and psychological support for their actions.  
Assaults against civilians in isolated undefended villages in Cyprus constituted 
genocide, regardless of the number of casualties or the size of the international outcry. 
Furthermore, such crimes are usually kept secret for some time. The only difference 
between Cyprus and the former Yugoslavia is that, in Cyprus, most of the atrocities were 
not committed by national armies but by EOKA B and TMT terrorists. That said, there is 
no excuse, of course, for the crimes committed during the invasion by the Turkish 
soldiers against the trapped north-Cyprus Greek Cypriot civilians and the retaliation by 
Greek Cypriot soldiers and civilians against the Turkish Cypriot civilians caught in the 
south of Cyprus. 
In most ethnic conflicts, the international community is usually either indifferent 
or silent during the crisis and does not intervene until it becomes a full-blown war. 
Contrarily, in Cyprus, the international intervention was determinative to the evolution of 
events and then totally passive during the war, which erupted at the invasion. In short, the 
crisis in Cyprus was a denouement of economic, political, and strategic competition, 
rather than ethnic aversion. Usually, in ethnic conflicts, constituent characteristics such as 
a common national identity or a religious passion are enough to spur dissention. Both of 
those existed in Cyprus, as secondary influences, but also primary excuses to be ascribed 
to.  
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Sometimes ethnic conflicts are financed and supported with arms by external 
powers with mutual national or religious roots. However, in our case, Greece and Turkey 
cannot be considered external powers, whose nationality and religion coincided with the 
respective Cyprus communities, because those were just part of the total island populace. 
Thus, they were not like the Croats and the Bosnians, who were armed and trained to 
fight the Serbs; the Algerians, who found support and resources in Morocco and Egypt to 
fight against the French; or the Iraqis, who were supported and armed by the United 
States to fight the Iranians. It is also important to point out that the great number of 
Soviet arms that reached Cyprus were used mainly by the conflicting civil groups, and 
not so much either against the Turkish Cypriots or for defense against the Turkish troops 
during the invasion. 
Religious fanaticism is often a major factor enhancing national expectations and 
ambitions, even in democratic states. Religious leaders many times lead the national 
struggle for peoples’ rights, thereby sanctifying using the means of war and its necessary 
informalities. However, in Cyprus, after 1960, the senior religious representative was also 
the president of the independent state. During his presidency and earlier, President, and 
Archbishop, Makarios, took a temperate position compared to Grivas and the rightwing 
parties that were fighting for enosis. Eventually, Makarios’s argument with the 
nationalistic fighters of EOKA B was responsible for assaults against his life and a 
military coup in Cyprus. As regards the Turkish Cypriot side, the religious influences 
kept a low profile46 and did not play an important role in the crisis. 
A long-lasting coexistence of diverse groups under the same, self-administrative 
state often encourages the development of disagreements and even rival sentiments. 
Bosnia, for example, was less violent under Austrian, Turkish, and Communist rule than 
when its constituent ethnic groups were asked to create a multiethnic state.47 Independent 
multiethnic states often lose cohesion and collapse when the balance among the counter-
tendency forces change. Likewise, Cyprus under British administration after 1925 was 
                                                 
46 The New Turks movement in the early twentieth century dominated Turkey and separated religion 
from the political, making Turkey’s government secular in an Islamic country. 
47 Henry Kissinger, The Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 195. 
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more peaceful than after its independence in 1960. The speed with which an independent 
Cyprus collapsed, after only three years, however, indicates that there were other, 
accelerating factors at work than those generally found to contribute to ethnic conflicts.  
Some might claim that, even if international intervention was critical and an 
accessory to the conflict, this does not mean that the Cyprus conflict was not ethnic in 
nature, because ethnic tensions do not always conclude in the collision of the constituent 
groups involved in the crisis. But in the case of Cyprus, the disruptive tensions were not 
the product of the communities’ antipathy toward one another. What was viewed from 
the outside as an internal conflict was actually an illegal conflict consisting of actions by 
terrorists on both sides that lacked any social or political support. Furthermore, the acts of 
separatism were preparing the way for a Turkish invasion and the acts of expulsion which 
followed, intended to legitimize the use of force and what the military means had gained. 
In light of the many characteristics of ethnic conflicts described above, it is hard 
to equate the Cypriot crisis and the opposing ethnic tensions that challenged Cyprus’s 
viability with the Yugoslavian and other ethnic wars. If the ethnic rivalry was strong 
enough to quickly cause the abolition of the constitution, the opposing communities 
would have been at war much earlier and no one would have agreed to create a free and 
independent state. 
In the next chapter, we will attempt to consider more analytically both internal 
and external factors in order to determine whether the war in 1974, which either caused 
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IV. HOW INTERNATIONAL POWERS, THE TWO 
MOTHERLANDS, DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, CIVIL WARS, AND 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS INFLUENCED THE CRISIS 
A.   THE INTERNATIONAL POWERS: GREAT BRITAIN, THE UNITED 
STATES, AND THE SOVIET UNION 
The interference of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union in the 
crisis in Cyprus determined more than the evolution of events and the invasion itself, 
because the Cyprus issue also involved the international political problems of Greece and 
Turkey. Great Britain, as one of those who established the administration and those who 
were stipulated by the London-Zurich agreement as guarantors of the constitution,  was 
largely responsible for the increase of agitation among the Cypriot population and the 
first skirmishes. Their responsibility ended, however, with the Turkish fleet’s departure 
from the Turkish coast. 
Although neither the United States nor the Soviet Union used force to either deter 
or enforce violent action, their most serious involvement began during the invasion. Their 
less direct intervention in the crisis began, however, long before July 1974. The U.S. 
secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, deserves the lion’s share of the responsibility. Before 
1963, the crisis in Cyprus, because of its Cold War context, brings to mind the Cuban 
nuclear missile crisis. However, the tone of the dispute remained low-key and a 
superpower confrontation was avoided. But the diplomatic manipulations that followed 
are a subject of much study because of their speed, their implementation, and, especially, 
their complexity. 
1. Great Britain  
Even in its early years of colonization, Great Britain did not view Cyprus as a 
primary target of its policy of expansion. In any case, neither Britain’s resources nor its 
size promised a successful outcome to its grandiose ambitions. Because of its strategic 
location, however, Cyprus was always an important outpost that Britain relied on in ways 




Figure 3.   The British Prime Minister in 1974: Harold Wilson.48 
 
The successful outcome of the Second World War left Great Britain with a nice 
heritage in the Middle East, the Suez was ripe for exploitation, and Cyprus played a key 
role in the region. However, the WWII victory was also accompanied by waves of 
nationalism and ethnic assertion around Europe, especially in such strategic nodal areas 
as the Suez Canal and the Middle East. A heightened sense of nationalism in Egypt after 
Gamal Abdel Nasser’s coup in 1954 constrained the British from transferring their 
headquarters to the militarily poorly structured Cyprus. From their headquarters in 
Cyprus, the British controlled units in Jordan, Iraq, and Libya. In addition, Cyprus was 
upgraded to host an M-16 missile system which controlled additional M-16 systems in 
Beirut, Tel Aviv, Amman, Jeddah, Baghdad, Tehran, Basra, Damascus, Cairo, and Port 
Said. The island also housed a British early-warning radar system and electronic spying 
stations. By 1955, Britain’s Akrotiri base was considered the best-controlled territory 
between the British home-base in England and the Far East. In general, Cyprus was also 
the most important station operationally of British intelligence,49 though that operability 
                                                 
48 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harold_Wilson. (May 2007). 
49 Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage, and Turkish 
Invasion (London, NY: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), 6–7). As the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden 
said, “No Cyprus, no certain facilities to protect our supply of oil. No oil, unemployment and hunger in 
Britain. It is as simple as that.” 
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was challenged in the war for the Suez Canal in August 1956, as it was the starting point 
for all the British and French operations.  
With the Baghdad Pact of 1955 between Great Britain, Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan, 
major oil sources were secured, at least for a time. But maintaining control in the area 
required keeping Cyprus and reclaiming the Suez Canal. Great Britain’s intention to keep 
Cyprus was challenged by an ethnic Greek Cypriot “revolutionary war,” and reclaiming 
the Suez Canal demanded the help of military support from the United States, France, and 
Israel. Although the U.S. economic and personnel support never came to much, the 
American’s blockage of Britain’s right to IMF funds left the British economy in critical 
condition.50 Therefore, operations under the British, French, and Israelis against Egypt 
were abandoned, and the regime’s control over the Suez Canal returned to almost its 
previous condition. The resulting new balance of power in the region gave even greater 
importance to Cyprus and increased the need to keep it under control.  
One of the significant factors that influenced Cyprus’s future under British 
administration was the EOKA’s resistance to British control which had already started. 
The EOKA not only tried to rid Cyprus of British rule, but also turned against the British 
and French troops operating in Suez. From the very first day of that war, there were 
bombings and offensives against camps and soldiers in Nicosia, and against naval and 
storage facilities, pipelines, and vehicles in Famagusta, Limassol, and Paphos. General 
Grivas led the EOKA struggle, using both direct and indirect confrontation methods that 
caused significant losses to the British forces. Many French and British airplanes were hit 
during landings and take-offs by this unpredictable and unexpected enemy, making 
operations in Suez even more difficult. Sabotage operations in Cyprus, especially 
bombings of Britain’s Akrotiri airbase, managed to delay the action in Suez for about two 
weeks. By the end of operations in Suez, more than 174 separate bombs had been 
lunched against British military targets and 124 bombs had struck vehicles and structures, 
raising the number of British losses to a higher level than during the operation against 
Egypt itself.51  
                                                 
50 O’Malley and Craig, 45. 
51 Ibid., 41–45. 
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The British failure in Suez signaled a new perspective for the future for both 
Cypriot and British bases. The Greek Cypriot struggle to disengage Cyprus from British 
administration, which was orchestrated by Greece, threatened not only Great Britain’s 
stay on the island but also by extension its interests in the Middle East.  
Britain’s WW II promise, still unfulfilled, to support a Greek Cypriot 
administration and ease the island’s enosis with Greece pushed Greece to demand its 
rights from the UN. The first step in the British countermeasures against the enosis 
struggle was its effort to block the UN process.52 However, such actions often result in a 
reaction. When their attempt to gain the much desired disengagement through legal 
channels was unsuccessful, the Greek Cypriots shifted their endeavors to illegal measures 
against British rule.  
In a domino effect, the second, more disastrous step in Britain’s attempt to 
maintain control was essentially a “divide and rule” tactic. Using the existing local ethnic 
differences to the maximum, they managed to awaken the nationalist sentiments of the 
island’s Turkish population and attempted to conscript them against the Greeks. Citing 
“Turkish intolerance” at the 29 August 1955 conference in London, Anthony Eden, the 
British prime minister, attempted to determine Cyprus’s future. In response, Turkish 
newspapers reported those “threatening speeches” and warlike scenarios. In Cyprus, the 
British security forces imposed restrictions and penalties to maintain security, creating an 
auxiliary police force made up entirely of Turkish Cypriots.53 Thus, for the first time, 
EOKA fighters found themselves positioned against the Turkish Cypriot people, thereby 
creating a new dimension in the war.  
Britain’s coercive interference, which included an ambitious plan to illegitimately 
supply guns to Turkish civilians, was done under the cover of their supposed need to 
defend themselves against Greek fighters. From that time on, the fight against the foreign 
                                                 
52 It was the Greek Prime Minister Averoff who contacted Grivas in Cyprus and passed him the 
American falling away from backing due to the Greek side’s attempts to gain in the Cyprus issue through 
the UN and the hard way that Grivas was running the events in Cyprus. (O’Malley and Craig, 50).  The 
General Committee of the UN voted against Cyprus’s inclusion on the agenda for Fall 1955 because the 
United States, Great Britain, Luxemburg, Norway, and France voted against it. Theodoros Couloumbis, 
United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), 29. 
53 O’Malley and Craig, 21–22. 
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occupiers was transformed into a fight against a legal peace force with new rights, 
requirements, flags, and ideology.54 The British intelligence agency was primarily 
responsible for instigating this violent ethnic dimension into the rules of the game. 
Scotland Yard experts were assigned to gather and train Turkish Cypriots, and to pay 
them attractive salaries and encourage them to leave their current occupations. Special 
training took place in Turkey and Kenya. Thus, by the end of 1956, more than six 
hundred Turkish Cypriots comprised a TMT special force, which was recognized and 
commanded, not by the Cypriot police chief, but by a “Scottish Effendi.”55 In this way, a 
secret military organization was conscripted and trained to take on the burden of 
defending British interests in Cyprus, thereby preventing a general British or global 
outcry. 
A few days after the first fights between the EOKA and the TMT on Cyprus, the 
British ambassador declared that a “new ‘Frankenstein’ “ had been created “by Britain’s 
encouragement of Turkish involvement in shaping Cyprus’s future, … whose control 
would be impossible. For this interference, history will no doubt hold Great Britain 
accountable for the wrong it did in Cyprus.”56 
The British could have chosen a different path: they could have successfully 
maintained both their bases in Cyprus and their control over the Middle East; they could 
even have ceded Cyprus to Greece. But that would have disappointed Turkey, a partner in 
the Baghdad Pact, which had redrawn their Eastern interests in land and access to oil. 
Instead, Britain decided to embroil both communities in conflict by awakening Turkish 
nationalism and “washing its hands” of what happened next. Thus, the confrontation 
became an ethnic conflict, inflaming the communities with the passion and feelings of 
revenge. Inevitably, since the conflict did not involve national armies, but only armed 
groups, sooner or later the ethnic rivalry would be directed against civilians, especially in 
                                                 
54 “Apart from periods of truce, the Greek-Cypriots had for three years been shooting British soldiers 
in the back. The natural sympathy of the (British) army as a whole inevitably with the Turks, who were as 
loyal, courageous allies, sharing the same dangers in pursuit of the common enemy – EOKA” (Costas 
Yennaris, From the East [London & Bath: Elliot & Thompson, 1999]), 142. 
55 For analytical narratives of how the British recruited young Turkish Cypriot or Turkish men for the 
war against EOKA, see Yennaris, 127–131. 
56 Ibid., 131. 
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the undefended villages. Attacks against civilians, however, are crimes of terrorism, 
making EOKA a terrorist group, despite its initial intention to promote revolutionary 
ideas, self-determination, and moral principles. 
Even Britain’s Prime Minister Eden himself soon realized that the Turkish 
embroilment in Cyprus’s future created an explosive recipe for disaster.57 While the 
agitation within the Cypriot communities and the fights between the terrorist groups and 
civilians had a very low profile compared to other more well-known “ethnic conflicts,” 
they provided a sufficient basis for Greek and Turkish exploitation in support of their 
offensive plans against one another. In other words, while the nature of the conflict did 
not change and acquire traditional ethnic-conflict characteristics, it did provide a basis for 
further intervention and blame by all the other interested countries. 
The British contribution to the ethnic rivalry of the island culminated with the 
constitution of 1960 in the Treaty of London-Zurich where they, following past practice, 
introduced the power-sharing model. Earlier in Lebanon, the British had created a power 
sharing administration that consisted of a Maronite President, a Sunni prime minister, a 
Shia speaker of parliament, and which had to have six Christians to every five Muslims. 
Later in Belfast, the British appointed a Protestant chief executive besides a Catholic 
deputy chief executive and a Cabinet apportioned according to the two-to-one Protestant 
majority in the province. As the Cyprus model failed in 1963 and broke down with the 
Greek coup’s intervention and the Turkish invasion, the “Belfast model collapsed under 
the strain of the working-class Protestant opposition” and the Lebanese model collapsed 
“when Muslim-Maronite friction and foreign interference became so intense that 
parliament could no longer elect a president.”58  
For that exploitation of the sensitive ethnic distinctiveness of the region and given 
the ethnic character the crisis acquired, Great Britain could be charged as an accessory to 
a moral crime. Britain could also be charged for its efforts in blocking Greece’s attempt 
to resolve the problem through the UN and for its indifferent and passive stance during 
                                                 
57 O’Malley and Craig, 23. 
58 Robert Fisk Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon (New York, Atheneum 1990), 67-68. 
 39
both the establishment of a Greek coup in Cyprus and the Turkish invasion. It was guilty 
also of counteracting several NATO mandates and interests in the area. Britain’s 
unilateral manipulations destabilized the region, transferred the Cold War practices and 
climate into a sensitive, inflexible environment, and raised opposing assertions at a time 
and in an area that, as the years have shown, they could no longer handle alone. 
2. The United States 
The United States was not involved either in the military operations during the 
Cyprus crisis or with any of the official public statements and recommendations. 
However, the evolution of events satisfied considerable U.S. interests and U.S. 
manipulations dominated the political and diplomatic field. Thus, apart from the NATO 
superpower’s actions during the Cold War era and Cyprus’s obvious strategic 
importance, many sources and documents denounce the U.S. interference in the conflict, 
which lasted from early 1960 until its conclusion in 1974.  
 
 
Figure 4.   The American Secretary of the State in 1974: Henry Kissinger.59 
 
Of course, the Turkish invasion which resulted in the island’s division and the 
thousands of casualties were not in America’s interest. But the fact that the southeastern  
 
                                                 
59 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Kissinger. (May 2007). 
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flank of NATO maintained peace and that Greece and Turkey after the crisis remained 
aligned and committed to Western mandates despite Eastern influences was a credit to 
American foreign policy.  
The American involvement began early in 1950 when the United States, as a UN 
member, rejected the inclusion of the Cypriot issue in the UN60 agenda. The United 
States intervened more decisively, though still keeping a low profile, when President 
Johnson condemned Turkey’s ambition to invade Cyprus in 1967.61 From that time on, 
due to the eruption of violence on the island, the United States interference occurred via 
two important U.S. entities, the CIA and the later secretary of state, Henry Kissinger. 
The Greek Cypriot community ascribes criminal responsibility to both, with the 
secretary of state at the head, because it is difficult to charge an organization of 
individuals whose work, however, is faceless. In two books, Years of Upheaval and Years 
of Renewal, Kissinger dedicates considerable space to the Cyprus conflict. He explains 
not only his own manipulations and intentions but also the contemporary political 
situation inside the United States and the precarious balance that existed between Greece, 
Turkey, and the Soviet Union. In his descriptive and representative political analysis, he 
tries to separate the American role62 from the evolution of events, forgoing and excusing 
his own embroilment. He places responsibility on the ethnic rivalry between Greece and 
Turkey and on individuals such as President Makarios and the Greek Colonels. Basically, 
Kissinger considers small nations “troublemakers”63 and categorizes the Cypriot conflict 
as an “ethnic conflict” similar to that of Bosnia. He blames Archbishop Makarios64 for 
                                                 
60 “The United States was clearly concerned to avoid any implications of forestalling a Cypriot appeal 
to the United Nations.” Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Cyprus: International Law 
and the Prospects for Settlement (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1991), 13. 
61 Letter from President Johnson to President Inonu.(Joseph S. Joseph, Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict, and 
International Politics: From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union [New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, Inc.), 158. The message from the secretary of state confirms the American opposition to the 
Turkish aims. 
62 Henry Kissinger, “Mythology of the U.S. involvement in Cyprus,” Years of Renewal (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1999), 216. 
63 John L. Scherer, Blocking the Sun (University of Minnesota, 1997), 38. 
64 “Makarios is too big for so small an island” (Kissinger, in Joseph, Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict, and 
International Politics, 74). 
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the destabilization of the island’s regime because of his initiative in editing amendments 
to the constitution and his Soviet orientation. This orientation, Kissinger claims, and the 
acquisition of Soviet guns and missiles, provoked the Greek coup’s anticommunism 
feelings65 and its efforts to get rid of him. Makarios’s decisive actions and enticing 
initiatives, in Kissinger’s eyes, did not befit a newborn state’s leader with a religious 
attribute. New and small states should naturally rely for their survival on stronger states 
and should stay committed and faithful to their protectors. Contrarily, Archbishop 
Makarios opened fronts against Greece, Turkey, Britain, the United States, and the 
domestic enosis strugglers of EOKA B, while at the same time asking for Soviet and 
Arabic support. 
Kissinger characterized the American position during the crisis as neutral and 
docile, and made excuses for the American political system which does not give absolute 
control to any one of its three branches66 and, consequently, to him as a U.S. 
representative. Additionally, according to Kissinger, the presidential transition had 
paralyzed the decision-making mechanisms67 of U.S. foreign policy at a critical time, 
providing an excellent opportunity for the Turkish leaders to exploit their extremist 
ambitions. But even more than the American inability to intervene in or deter events, 
Kissinger holds the Greek faction responsible for the tragedy. To him, this included not 
only the dictators, but also Karamanlis’s political government. Kissinger claims that 
Makarios’s Soviet-missile acquisitions impelled the Greek Colonels to react against him 
and created the conditions for the first Turkish invasion. Karamanlis’s immature and 
prejudiced manipulations against the United States’ initiatives68 also prompted the 
second invasion. Thereafter, trying again to absolve his own role of blame, Kissinger 
admits that President Ford’s concessions to Turkey69 and his attempt to blandish the 
Greek side after the invasion made him unwelcome to the Greek leaders.   
                                                 
65 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 202. 
66 Ibid., 233. 
67 Ibid., 231. 
68 Ibid., 234. 
69 Ibid., 233. 
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Though Kissinger’s argument does not explain all the folds of history surrounding 
the events in Cyprus, it is of considerable importance because of his central position. The 
points of his argument also reflect his intention to convince his readers that neither he nor 
the framers of American foreign policy had had any previous experience with ethnic 
conflicts.70 But while he repeatedly ascribes the cause of the invasion to ethnic conflict 
and claims his own involvement was negligible, he does not explain why he kept his 
movements secret from the other involved officials and partners. He does this even 
though he had complete information about the events and even so did not send a deterring 
message as his predecessor had.71 Kissinger’s interests and actions are at least 
questionable. For we recall that he was upset with the Europeans’ lack of support for U.S. 
efforts to aid Israel during the Yom Kippur72 war, in which Israel’s security was 
challenged, and how this was influenced by Cyprus’s political and military situation. 
Moreover, Kissinger admits that Turkey’s geopolitical location in relation to the Soviet 
Union’s and Middle East borders was more important to U.S. interests73 than the 
geopolitical location of Greece. This explains Kissinger’s mild reaction to the Turkish 
plans and his inaction while those were completed and secured.  
The CIA’s role in the crisis is evident in the support it gave the established 
dictators in Greece in 1967 and in the major role the organization played during the 
Turkish invasion in 1974.74 The idea of supporting a pro U.S. dictatorship in Greece was 
initiated as early as the 1960s, when the Papandreou government came into conflict with 
the CIA and the U.S. Information Agency on Special Matters, and his son Andreas tried 
to bring the Greek Central intelligence Agency (KYP) under his control.75 The 
contrariness between Papandreou and the United States continued after the former’s 
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rejection of the Acheson Plan, which expressed the official American position on the 
problem. According to the Plan, the United States’ position was aligned with Turkish 
ambitions and directed at the partition of the island.76 Consequently, the possibilities of a 
left-wing coup, organized and directed by Andreas Papandreou’s secret group, Aspida, or 
The Shield, and the total dominance of Georgios Papandreou’s Center Union in the 
upcoming elections,77 would create an exigent change in the official attitude toward 
strategic American interests. This change called for a right-wing military coup by 
accredited, ambitious, and powerful officers with key positions in the army, such as some 
colonels of the KYP who were closely connected to the CIA. 
We should point out, however, that none of these conspiracy theories have ever 
been substantiated by a “smoking gun” in the declassified archival record. But many 
testimonies, studies, and reports do agree and verify that the U.S. involvement in Cyprus 
was not only determinative but also “distributed” throughout all the bodies of command 
of the American government. By inference, having always in mind that U.S. actions were 
aimed only at satisfying American interests in the region, the United States influenced 
events, determined their unfolding, and “allowed” the Turkish invasion to occur. And it 
did this for the following reasons. 
At the time Greece and Turkey were simultaneously accepted into the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States was aspiring to gain greater influence in 
the eastern Mediterranean and, by extension, direct access to both its enemy, the Soviet 
Union, and the Middle East. However, the ethnic hostility between Greece and Turkey 
undermined their role as a go-between78 in regard to American interests. So when the 
time came for the United States to resolve decisively the crisis in Cyprus, the risk of 
losing either Greece or Turkey or of endangering NATO’s credibility and integrity, and  
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thus, its survival, kept the United States at a safe distance. Thus, the U.S. involvement 
was limited to only indirect, “off the record” measures that nourished and abetted 
conspiracy scenarios and theories. 
In January 1964, another incident deterred America’s “official” involvement: 
President Makarios’s rejection of a NATO plan79 that provided for the deployment of 
10,000 security troops on the island and for Western mediation for resolution. Its 
rejection compelled the United States to search for a different means to keep Cyprus 
under U.S. control. 
On 11 May 1974, an American jet landed in Cyprus to pick up secret service 
equipment that was of vital importance from an intelligence station,80 using specially 
trained units. On 10 August, three days before the second invasion, while all the national 
leaders from Greece and Turkey were in Geneva, a Turkish major who was carrying the 
plans for the invasion was captured by Greek-Cypriot forces.81 Both these incidents show 
that everyone –the United States, Great Britain, Greece, and Cyprus– knew about the 
Turkish invasion. No one tried to stop it because, as far as it concerns the United States, 
Turkey had realized its ability to blackmail82 the United States by threatening to achieve 
the same goals using the Soviet Union instead of the United States. 
Turkish Prime Minister Bullet Ecevit, despite having been Kissinger’s student83 
during a Harvard seminar, was a left-wing ideologist. He exploited to the fullest degree 
the United States’ attempt to keep him aligned with NATO instead of with the Soviets, 
who were ready to be involved in the crisis. In other words, Ecevit managed to transform 
Turkey into the “big fish”84 in the game, that both superpowers were being challenged to 
obtain. 
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Around 1964, during the Papandreou regime, Cyprus had more than 10,000 Greek 
troops,85 a very promising number in terms of the island’s security against invasion. After 
the establishment of a Greek dictatorship in 1967, in response to U.S. requests the Greek 
troops returned to Greece. This provided an opportunity for a peaceful settlement of the 
Cyprus issue within NATO mandates and the Acheson Plan. However, according to 
contemporary writers and most of the Greek and Greek Cypriot people, this opened the 
door to Turkish invasion. But since the Turks’ first opportunity to invade in 1967 was 
deterred by President Johnson, the latter accusation seems exaggerated. Any potential 
political confrontation was directed mainly against the Papandreou regime and any left-
wing power in Cyprus, not against the Cyprus defense force.  
After 1967, the military regime in Greece had significant U.S. political support 
and was also supplied with a great number of arms by the United States.86 However, the 
Nixon government, under pressure exerted by public opinion and the European Council, 
slightly altered the U.S. policy and stopped supporting the Greek colonels, at least 
publicly. This shift in policy by the U.S. government may be what prompted the colonels 
to cooperate with the American secret service and to trust them even more, at the same 
time, taking a risky initiative in Cyprus. 
The imposition of an embargo on U.S. military supplies to Turkey was not really 
a reaction against the Turkish invasion, but the result of a mobilized Greek lobby87 in 
America that was trying to shift U.S. foreign policy toward Greek interests. This had little 
impact on the benefits that Turkey gained from invading Cyprus, however. Nonetheless, 
since the invasion the United States has maintained a solid position in regard to missing 
persons88 and the remaining Turkish troops in the captured northern part of the island. 
This is because of Turkey’s increasing value in the evolving situation between Israel and 
Iraq in the Middle East since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the withdrawal of 
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Turkish troops without agreement on a security solution would cause agitation and 
revenge operations instead of the current peace, even though it is maintained with arms. 
The United States has not provided any assistance or actual mediation toward 
solving the Cyprus problem because it has always benefited from maintaining Greece and 
Turkey in a safe and peaceful rivalry. By maintaining that instability, the United States 
can continue to exert its influence in the area and keep the levels of military purchases by 
both antagonists very high.89 
Another aspect that shows America’s compliance in the Turkish invasion and 
subsequent demands has to do with Turkey’s eastern borders. Cyprus’s interests were 
sacrificed by the United States in return for the national interests that Turkey relinquished 
in the Middle East.90 For example, Turkey’s withdrawal from its territorial claims against 
the Lebanese and Iraqi oil resources was confirmed by its participation in the British-
dominated Baghdad Pact of February 1955, which was, however, an issue of internal 
criticism. That shared “identity of Turkish interests”91 with the involvement of the United 
States in Middle East issues did not allow much hope for a greater claim, unless those 
could by exchanged for equal Turkish claims in a different location, such as in Cyprus. 
One final reason that the United States “allowed” the Turkish invasion is our 
personal assessment derived from our research. The United States “allowed” the Turkish 
invasion because the evolution of events eased the gradual creation of the “new Europe” 
model that the United States had long had in mind. We noted in our historical review that 
the Turkish troops were not content simply to defeat the Greeks and occupy northern 
Cyprus. They continued south to eliminate the British bases. We also saw that Cyprus 
was of key importance to Great Britain’s continued dominance in the Middle East and to 
the Baghdad Pact. Britain’s loss of the basses fit with the American concept of a new, 
integrated, powerful, and unified Europe with its borders identified geographically 
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throughout. These aspirations provided for a new Europe allied with the United States, 
with coinciding and equivalent members and European orientations that would assert 
their influence on out-of-area targets only through NATO mandates. The new Europe 
would consist of effete individual members, but would create a strong totality and be a 
strong, conscripted, and controllable ally. 
3. The Soviet Union 
For most historians who have studied the Cyprus crisis, the Soviet Union was 
merely a beholder of events and contributed precious little to their evolution. This 
ratiocination seems correct to those who consider the Cypriot crisis an extension of long-
standing Greco-Turkish conflicts and therefore an intra-NATO dispute. But even if the 
Cyprus crisis is considered an internal NATO problem, it would be unwise to deny that it 
also provided a good opportunity for the Soviet Union to intervene and gain from the 
situation, especially as the field of interest was so close to its borders. Although few 
studies are dedicated to the Soviet contribution, we will briefly describe some of the more 
obscure folds of the pertinent international diplomacy.  
 
 
Figure 5.   The General Secretary of the Soviet Party in 1974: Leonid Brezhnev.92 
 
During the early post–WWII years, the Soviet Union tried to gain access to the 
warm Mediterranean waters. But the peaceful settlement between Churchill and Stalin93 
for the distribution of the Balkan countries, and the Soviet Union’s unsuccessful attempt 
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to establish communism by civil war in Greece and Turkey in the following years, 
excluded any legal Soviet right to that access unless it could find an appropriate “ally.” 
The ally that emerged was Cyprus, which was as legal as could be desired. Not only did 
the local communist party, AKEL, follow a normal democratic process, it was also the 
most popular party on the island. In addition, Cyprus’s president and religious leader was 
orientated to the Soviets through old religious ties to Russia.94 Makarios’s nonalignment 
with Western mandates, rejection of the NATO peace plan, and decision to follow a UN 
path sounded the alarm for U.S. and British interests in the region. Blocking the Soviets’ 
legal involvement via the UN, however, impelled Moscow to follow the same backstage 
method to support the left-wing regime of Cyprus.  
Cyprus gave the Soviets an opportunity not only to endanger the eastern flank of 
NATO and its future aspirations in the Middle East, but also to cause instability within 
NATO by transferring the Greco-Turkish dispute to the alliance. Moreover, contrary to 
the Cuban crisis of 1962, in which the Soviet Union had backed away from its position 
due to American decisiveness, the crisis in Cyprus was so close to the Soviet borders that 
it could not go unattended unless the Soviets gained an equivalent benefit.   
So, from the very first moment of the crisis, the Soviet Union supported 
Makarios’s government, supplying the island with large quantities of arms, including 
heavy artillery, tanks, torpedo boats, and anti-aircraft missiles.95 The Soviets declared 
that this action was part of the legal and matter-of-course right of the Cypriots to defend 
their freedom. The assistance was extended politically in an open hearing in 1964 that 
threatened the Turks with a “boomerang effect” if they should invade. At the same time, 
Khrushchev himself sent a message to Washington that the Soviet Union “cannot and 
will not remain indifferent to the threat of an armed conflict near her southern borders.”96  
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In a letter to President Johnson, Khrushchev condemned the Americans for “aiming at 
actual occupation by NATO forces of the Republic of Cyprus which adheres to a policy 
of nonalignment with military blocs.”97 
However, in 1974, the Soviet attitude toward Turkish ambitions changed 
dramatically in favor of them, an effect that can be explained by the Soviet-Turkish 
rapprochement. The Turks, disappointed by an American “lack of sensitivity” in fulfilling 
their goals in the Cypriot crisis, shifted their interest toward the Soviet faction. The 
Soviets established close political and economic bonds with the Turks, which culminated 
in a $3.8 billion agreement in 1979. Their loss of legal access to the island after 
Makarios’s dethroning by a military coup reduced their objections to the invasion. And, 
in effect, the Soviets changed sides, deserting Cyprus and all those who relied on Soviet 
help alone to fight against the Turkish imperialistic aggression.  
Those dependent on the Soviets included: the Greek dictators and their fatal plans 
for enosis; the terrorists of EOKA B working for the same plan; the Americans’ reluctant 
and hesitant counterbalancing of its own interests in the area; and the British inability to 
protect its own interests and put out the fire it had started on the island. This change of 
the balance of power was the actual, absolute reason for the drama in Cyprus. The Soviet 
Union was responsible. This did not indicate any specific antipathy by the Soviets against 
other nations, of course. It was just how diplomacy works and a manifestation of the real, 
impermanent, and flexible nature of international relations that are based on individual 
interests of any kind. Indeed, in 1922 and 1955 in Turkey, a similar scenario with almost 
the same leading actors resulted in thousands of native residents losing their homes and 
property.   
B. THE TWO CYPRIOT MOTHERLANDS: GREECE AND TURKEY 
1. Greece 
Most Greeks, even today, ignore or pass along the contribution of the Greek side 
at the events of the summer of 1974 due to fact that the actions of the Greek coup did not  
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represent the Greek people and were not authorized by any legal government. However 
the established coup in Cyprus and the effort to annex the island through violence by the 
dictators in Greece gave the excuse to the Turks to invade.   
 
 
Figure 6.   The “Colonels”: Leaders of the Dictatorship in Greece from '67-'74.98 
 
The drama of Cyprus which meant the loss of another old country along with 
many thousands of compatriots caused great anger and pain in the Greek community. The 
people insisted that charges be brought and that those who were guilty of the crime 
should be convicted. But both the political and the military leaders rejected the idea of 
declaring war against Turkey, which would have appeased the passions of the crowds. 
The need for someone to assume responsibility became crucial. Representatives of the 
new democracy found it easy to blame the dictatorship and American intervention, as if 
the political situation in Greece before the first invasion and during the second was 
entirely innocent and uninvolved. Indeed, from the Greek perspective, both the political 
and the military factions had a significant role in the Cyprus crisis and were responsible 
for the evolution of events that led to the conflict.    
After the civil war of 1946–49, democracy in Greece struggled to survive and to 
defeat the ultra-right factions that intended to seize power by force of arms but found 
themselves isolated after their victory against the communists. At the same time, many 
imprisoned leftist ideologues, graven with the sign of communism, were used to justify 
the rightist influences inside the government. Thus, the postwar Greek political scene 
consisted of an insecure democracy dependent on a weak government that consisted 
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mainly of shortsighted political alliances marked by a micropartisan tendentiousness. The 
political regime cultivated a client relationship between the parties and the voters, which 
meant that the government’s survival depended on political manipulation and decision-
making that had a low political cost.  
 
Figure 7.   The first Greek Prime Minister after the dictatorship: Konst. Karamanlis.99 
 
But decisions that plunge a country into war are usually politically risky decisions 
that, in addition to decisive leaders, require a powerful regime, which most of the pre-
coup governments did not have. On the other hand, a temporary, beleaguered government 
can hardly deal with serious foreign policy issues, especially when there is no constant 
official political will or plan, as was the case in postwar Greece. Indeed, the problematic 
governance of the country during the 1960s worried the people very much. And this, in 
turn, created even more opportunities for nonpolitical factions to intervene, such as by a 
coup by the king.100 It is no exaggeration to say that many welcomed a temporary 
intervention by either the king or the army, which was closely connected with the king, in 
order to obtain the desired political stability. However, aside from the problems that the 
unstable democratic regime caused within Greek politics, opening the door to a coup, the 
previous government and leaders had also made substantial mistakes that had a negative 
impact on the Cypriot crisis.  
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To Greece’s post–WWII governments, Cyprus was the reward Greece deserved in 
return for its contribution to the war, as had been promised by the British. Control of 
Cyprus was a privilege, they claimed, that derived from the island’s long Greek history, 
its predominantly Greek civilization, and its right to determine its own future according 
to Cyprus’s majority law. Cyprus was also the only remaining stronghold of a glorious 
empire that had extended far to the East and that, after five thousands years, had been 
violently uprooted by the same conqueror that had conquered Greece itself, the Ottomans. 
Cyprus represented the last hope for integration – without its expulsion from the land of 
its ancestors – of the only massive Greek population that remained outside of Greece 
itself.  
From the perspective of the pre-coup governments, Cyprus’s future was 
connected with Greece’s deep, emotional national sensitivities. But, in this regard, under 
pressure from ultra-right elements situated at high levels in the administration and army, 
they were constrained by a single, shortsighted strategy. One of its goals was the enosis 
of Cyprus with Greece. This was handled through the UN, but it became transformed 
after 1960 into a different goal, the independence of Cyprus while maintaining the 
dominant rights of the Greek majority. Both goals inequitably favored the Greek 
community and disregarded the existence of the Turkish Cypriot community. Both goals 
reflected the prejudiced Greek attitude toward both Cyprus and other international-
relations issues. The goals evidence the Greeks’ immature and cursory evaluation of the 
contemporary balance between the two island communities and their own inability to 
estimate and process the difficulties of that distinctly dual society. To Greece, Cyprus 
represented the prize in the face of Greco-Turkish antagonism, as if enosis was a solution 
also for the Turkish Cypriots. This display of indifference by the Greek government to 
the problems of the Turkish community regenerated their fear of rejection and insecurity. 
Their fear increased when large numbers of Greek officers were stationed on the island to 
deter a Turkish threat and when EOKA B terrorists used the British-Turkish military 
operations as an excuse to turn against innocent civilians.  
While the pre-coup government’s treatment of Cyprus was more emotional than 
logical and was very nearsighted, the decisions of the first democratic government after 
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the coup validated Greece’s intention to sacrifice Cyprus in order to advance its own 
interests. In a December 1974 council meeting,101 the Greek leaders tried unsuccessfully 
to convince their Greek-Cypriot counterparts that Greece had valid reasons for not 
protecting Cyprus either before or during the invasion. After analyzing these records, we 
concluded that the sacrifice of Cyprus was viewed by the pro-dictatorship forces as a 
means to cause the collapse of the Greek dictatorship and establish democracy in 
Greece.102 The Greek population would be convinced that the loss of Cyprus was due to 
the dictators and that the country should immediately return to a democratic rule.   
The cost of losing the northern part of Cyprus was also attributed to the dictators, 
so that Greece would not be forced to go to war with Turkey. War would have transferred 
the colonels’ mistakes to the new democratic administration, which would then have been 
blamed for any of the war’s disastrous consequences. Thus, for clearly political reasons, 
during the second invasion the Greek democratic regime denied protection to Cyprus. 
This cost the island great losses, including thousands of injured and uprooted civilians. 
However, the denial of protection should not be connected to the spirit of revenge and 
ambition that the rightists have capitalized on since the dramatic events in Cyprus. The 
protection we refer to here was simply a refusal to be involved in the thwarting of the 
Turkish plans.  
In any case, any action that maintains peace is only a temporary solution until a 
formal peace agreement is signed. The way the Greek governments both before and after 
the coup dealt with the Cyprus problem illustrates the importance of the political costs in 
post–WWII Greece: distancing itself from the problem only contributed to it and its 
evolution. However, the trigger of the gun, so to speak, was not pulled by the inattentive 
governments, but by the Colonels responsible for the coup. But before we place the entire 
blame on the coup, we should also point out the responsibility of a large segment of the 
Greek population. Many people supported the dictatorship by their silence and by their 
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lack of resistance. Their support was largely due to the economic enhancements that the 
colonels offered, mostly to members of the middle class; to the conveniences they 
granted to shipowners and other economic colossi; and to the economic growth in the 
country during the first three years of their rule.103   
Many times in the past, military forces have intervened in Greece to sieze control 
of the state. In most cases their intervention was brief, was beneficial to particular 
political parties, and was relinquished in favor of civil rule after their forces secured the 
stability of the state institutions. During the dictatorship of 1967, however, the colonels 
used the current confused political situation as an excuse to condemn all the political 
parties for misleading the people. Using rhetoric that had proved inspiring in previous 
revolutionary struggles, the military forces established their dictatorship on a loyal base. 
As we have seen, the colonels were the executers of Cyprus’s peace, security, and 
integrity,, and thus, were as guilty as the Turks for the many thousands of dead, injured, 
and expelled. Indeed, they were more guilty, because they did not have the excuse of 
needing to protect a part of the country’s population, the Turkish Cypriots, as the Turks 
did. They were also more guilty because it was their interference that provoked the Turks, 
thereby providing them an excuse for invading.  
It is the colonels who having trusted foreign secret services organized and ordered 
the struggle against the Cypriot president, Makarios. It is they who directed the declared 
civil war against compatriots, killing thousands of them and imprisoning many more. It is 
they who left Cyprus unprotected against foreign territorial aspirations, causing 
thousands of deaths, changing the island’s homogeneity, and damaging by their actions 
the Greek national image. Those actions comprised an atrocious display of violence 
against the legal government of Cyprus; against a political regime that was a response to 
both domestic demands and an international agreement; against Makarios as an 
individual, since they aimed at killing him regardless of his religious attribute and the  
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inspiration he evoked because of it; against innocent Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot 
civilians of all ages; and against the history, traditions, and future of an island that thirty-
two years later still cannot find peace.  
The colonels’ chief goal of course was to unite Cyprus with Greece, regardless of 
the consequences for the Turkish Cypriots’ future. The colonels’ background as rightists 
caused them to go against their own nationalist feelings and attribute their actions to an 
ethnic dimension that is directly opposite to what we have concluded so far was the case  
in the Cyprus crisis. We studied their declarations,104 tactics, maneuvers, and decisions, 
having always in mind that they had created civil war in Cyprus and that they raised their 
weapons against the Greeks Cypriots in much the same way that they had changed their 
weapons against the Greek students a few months earlier in Greece. As a result, we 
concluded that, in general, their motives were neither ethnically inspired nor ethnically 
oriented.   
The colonels’ actions were the result of their own personal ambitions and their 
great confidence in their movement. They used the ideology and slogans that the dictator 
Ioannis Metaxas had used during his dictatorship (1936–1941), glorifying him like a god 
because of his successful decision to array the country against Italy in WWII. By 
imitating Metaxas’s dictatorship, they intended to validate their ambitions and prove that 
they could do what the government in Greece had not been able to do – unite Cyprus with 
Greece. It was as though they hoped to inscribe their names in Greek history in letters of 
gold. And, indeed, if they had managed to unite Cyprus with Greece, their names would 
now rank equal to those of Kolokotronis, Venizelos, and Metaxas, who gave Greece its 
current borders. And no one would now talk about the deaths, but only about the 
sacrifices. But historians are often selective in their treatment of those who order the 
killing of millions. While some are called “beasts,” like Hitler, others are called 
“reformers,” like Bonaparte and Ataturk.   
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2. Turkey 
The Turkish invasion was the most direct foreign intervention and the culmination 
of the crisis on the island of Cyprus. The Turkish Army was the only official national 
army involved, and it changed dramatically the political makeup and the demographic 
distribution of the island. While the invasion improved Turkey’s contemporary 
negotiating power, it prevented a political resolution of the crisis for many decades. This 
was the case despite Turkish Minister Ecevit’s declaration in 1974 that the Cypriot 
problem was resolved.105 At the same time, it committed the Turkish Cypriot population 
in the north to isolation from the rest of the island.  
What is most important for this study, however, is our examination of the nature 
of the Turkish intervention. Was it a result of ethnic ambitions or, as in previous cases, a 
result of the imposition of domestic and international interests? While the Greco-Turkish 
ethnic rivalry in Cyprus is well known, we are attempting here to demonstrate that the 
Turkish intervention and invasion were not ethnically motivated, but were the result of 
other motivations. To demonstrate this, we begin with a brief outline of the political, 
social, and economic features of the Turkish state both before and at the time of the 
invasion. 
3. The Turkish State 
The political situation in post–WWII Turkey was similar to that of Greece. Civil 
war and military coups threatened the survival of both unstable democracies. But in 
Turkey the military faction remained powerful and influential, even during democratic 
periods and the adjustments they brought to the country’s foreign policy. The military 
maintained its power by moving into sensitive positions in the civil services, schools, and 
mass media. It is remarkable that the interventions of the army in 1960–61, 1971–73, and 
1980–83 were justified as constitutional106 and necessary for the security of the country’s  
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democratic orientation. In contrast, the inability of the unstable political governments of 
1961, 1964, 1965, and 1969 to secure democratic mandates after being accused of abuses 
and corruption107 provided an opportunity for the interference of the army.  
Turkish servicemen considered themselves inheritors and depositories of the 
Kemalic principles and defenders of a Westernization process through the secularism of 
the state. The role of “the state’s owner”108 that the army in Turkey demanded was 
augmented by an expressed conception of the national security ideology. By using 
psychology to keep the country convinced of the existence of danger from external and 
internal enemies, the army could act undeterred by the political bodies of the 
government.109 However, the army used a method that emboldened the nationalistic 
feelings of the people, contrary to its Western philosophy and the secular state it 
preserved. Thus, we assume that the army exerted pressure on the Turkish government in 
order to impose a military solution on Cyprus.  
 
Figure 8.   The Turkish Prime Minister in 1974: Bulent Ecevit.110 
 
Going deeper into the structure of the Turkish state and looking at its foundations, 
however, we find a mixture of serious political and social influences that gives the 
impression of a country acting under compulsion. That impression, though, is not correct. 
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By the time Kemal Ataturk seized power and drew on the national ethnic conscience to 
re-create the fragmented Islamic country, Turkey intended to begin a process of 
integration and renewal, using ethnic sensitivity as its most effectual weapon. This would 
secure and limit the newborn state because it would work better with the people.  
The ethnic cleansing of the Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, and Franks between 1890 
and 1922 and in 1955 demonstrated the success of the Turkish state in becoming more 
ethnically uniform. Waves of nationalist Panturkism and Panturanism111 raged 
significantly within Turkish society, recruiting members even among the elite and 
influencing politics in Turkey many times. The spearhead of these ideologies took the 
form of an ethnic extremist group known as the “Grey-wolves,”112 which was responsible 
for creating and arming a twin terrorist organization of Turkish expansionism in Cyprus, 
called the Turkish Cypriot Resistance Organization, or TMT.       
The purpose of the Cyprus TMT from beginning to end was terrorism. Having 
absolute backing from the Turkish government and the British secret service,113 the 
resistance organization initially conscripted its members in Cyprus. However, the basic 
goals of the group were to arouse the ethnic passions of the Turkish-Cypriot population 
against the Greek Cypriots and gather stray Turkish Cypriots into enclaves. The latter 
was done in order to more easily control and, more important, separate them, in 
preparation for the eventual partitioning of the island.  
Using provocation, TMT members managed to turn the Turkish Cypriots against 
the constitutional government and the EOKA B against the Turkish Cypriots. They used 
extreme violence against the Turkish Cypriots who refused to conform to their orders or 
who betrayed them. In only a few days, they forced more than 60 percent of the Turkish-
Cypriot population to leave their homes and jobs and gather into enclaves.114 Just like the 
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EOKA B, the TMT turned against their Turkish compatriots, destroying their balanced 
life and putting them in danger from both the Greeks and the Turks and from both 
individual and group wildness. The ethnic division that Turkey relied on was transformed 
into terrorism against the Turkish-Cypriot community in an effort to justify Turkey’s 
further political interference and finally its military intervention.  
Hence, nationalism for the Turks worked differently than the narrow 
interpretation of it that the Greeks ascribed to them. Nationalism was the most important 
constituent of Turkey’s drive to establish a new state. The resulting ethnic tension was 
not directed against any particular nation, but toward all those that they viewed as 
obstacles to Turkey’s safety or ambitions. The strategy worked, however, more because 
of internal consumption reasons than external influences. Thus, Turkey’s foreign policy 
does not follow the ethnically prejudiced logic that the Greeks assumed it did because of 
Turkey’s aggressive attitude. Turkey’s policies followed a well-prepared, methodical, and 
continuous tactic, based on the consideration that the country’s survivability relied on its 
ability to expand, secure the coherence of the state, and mollify the impetuosity caused by 
the internal ethnic tensions. Cyprus was a victim of Turkey’s “political” extremism and 
its fear of losing forever the Turkish population on the island. They believed that that 
development would result in corruption of the central government under pressure from an 
uncontrollable and angry populace.  
In addition to being poorer and less educated than the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish 
Cypriots had to compete with a larger, more highly organized population that could easily 
absorb and integrate them. We can compare the case of Cyprus with the great expulsion 
of Greeks in 1922 from Asia Minor, especially Smyrna, where they had prospered and 
continuously increased their power.115 Whether or not Cyprus was annexed by Greece, 
Turkey’s reaction is understandable. For Turkey with no constitution, an independent and 
self-determinant Cyprus would be inconvenient, because it would challenge the elites’ 
effects to portray the Turks as facing severe security threats.  
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Thus, to maintain control in the region, Turkey wanted to partition the population 
and by extension the entire island. Its leaders hoped that the ethnic dimension that Turkey 
infused into the crisis would validate its actions in the eyes of the Turkish people, would 
legitimize its intervention to the international community, and would maintain its vested 
rights after the invasion. In other words, Turkey ascribed an ethnic character to the crisis 
and thereby managed to separate the two communities, obliging the international 
community to resolve the conflict and leading to the current status. However, as we 
already mentioned, Turkey’s claim of success in respect to the ethnic dimension was 
clearly designed for internal consumption only. In contrast, what was evident on the 
island was the unprovoked terrorism deliberately conducted by the Turks against the 
Turkish Cypriots as an excuse for invasion. The warlike events of January 1996 between 
Greece and Turkey near the Imia Islands can also be described as necessary for internal 
consumption, to distract Turkish public opinion from the country’s serious economic and 
social problems.116   
Consequently, Turkey’s foreign policy has often been viewed as the result of 
Realpolitik, as conducted by an ethnically structured central state. That Turkey 
successfully achieved all its goals in Cyprus by military means and got off scot-free is a 
measure of its mature and efficient manipulation of the international scene. That success 
was also a result of Turkey’s ability to blackmail its Western allies and exploit its 
strategic geographical location to the utmost. The Turks used “indiscipline,”117 mostly 
against NATO and the United States, to demonstrate that Turkey had neither “ethnic” 
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friends nor “ethnic” rivals. It had merely adjusted its international relations according to 
its own interests regardless of their national derivation or any related alliance. That’s 
exactly what it claimed to have done in Cyprus.  
In addition to the political influences, the crisis in Cyprus had an economic 
aspect. Before the invasion, the northern part of Cyprus occupied by the Turkish army, 
though only 37 percent of the island, produced 70 percent of Cyprus’s wealth.118 That is 
why, despite the fact that less than 40 percent of Turkish Cypriots lived in the northern 
portion, Turkey chose that part to relocate them. As a result, about 40,000 Turkish 
Cypriots were forced to abandon their property and lives in the south and settle in the 
north.  
By inference, Turkey’s interest in Cyprus, which had served as a catalyst for the 
survival of the state’s ethnic mandates, was transformed into terrorism against both 
Cypriot communities, resulting in their partition and displacement. The Turkish military 
invasion was executed only to secure the advantage that they already had of separating 
the populations, as if this was the result of an ethnic confrontation that could be deterred 
in the future by maintaining that separatism. 
C. DOMESTIC AFFAIRS AND CIVIL WARS 
1. Cyprus 
So far we have investigated all but one of the countries that participated in the 
evolution of the Cyprus crisis, in an attempt to ascertain the motives that affected their 
decisions and how their interests would benefit from a resolution of the crisis. In that 
pursuit, we have investigated all the countries but one, Cyprus itself. We concluded that 
none of the countries acted in favor of the Cypriot people, and none supported or worked 
to promote the newly created democratic state. To the contrary, all of them harmed the 
people, their future prospects, and the security of Cyprus. In fact, all of the countries 
contributed dramatically to the conflict and demonstrated that, as far as they were 
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concerned, the Cypriot conflict was not an ethnic conflict. Even Greece and Turkey, 
whose ethnic rivalry is well recognized in international studies, despite being ethnically 
and emotionally tied to Cyprus, used an atrocious amount of military violence and terror. 
And they did so with little regard for the Cypriots who shared their ethnic identities but in 
a clear effort to benefit politically. We now turn to the ongoing effort to relieve the 
conflict in Cyprus of its ethnic dimension. This requires, first, examining Cyprus from the 
inside to distinguish between the communal, the individual, and the group influences. 
a. Communal Influences 
The unique ethnic sensitivities of the Cypriot biracial community were 
cited earlier. We did not discuss, however, the reaction of the two communities to 
“imported” influences or examine whether this was a result of their ethnic difference. 
Because much of the related literature was influenced by the fifteen-year escalation 
period that preceded the invasion, to understand Greco-Turkish relations in Cyprus it is 
important to study them in depth. Those mainly cursory studies almost always 
characterize Greece and Turkey as ethnic rivals. However, those were also the years that 
both the terrorist groups EOKA B and the TMT were recruiting and bombing at will, 
thereby creating a prime situation for the respective armies to intervene.  
More important, those were the only years that the communities were 
detached and mistrustful. Looking back on history, we find that that it was largely 
peaceful, safe, and creative. The fact that during the Greek revolutionary war of 1821, the 
Greek Cypriots abandoned their weapons to the Turkish sultan119 shows that they 
realized the necessity of a peaceful symbiosis. Many writers both confirm and explain the 
peaceful coexistence between the Greeks and Turks as a natural result of the scattered 
and mixed nature of the population. In addition, their everyday lives were very similar – 
for example, both had to struggle to earn a living – which outweighed their racial and 
religious differences.120 For many of the years under British rule, the union-based 
economy translated into a union-based community., and thus, both the Greek and the 
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Turkish Cypriots had the same basic interests: better wages, better working conditions, 
and improved social benefits and medical care.121 As a result, many writers attest to the 
bonds that existed between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots at the time of the invasion. 
Aside from a few acts of revenge on both sides by imitators of the terrorist groups, most 
historians find no evidence of enmity among them. Some even describe departing 
families giving their housekeys to arriving refugees “for them to look after it.”122 
We found that another factor, the diverse ways the two communities 
perceived the national struggle for independence, does not necessarily invalidate the 
evidence of their peaceful coexistence. To the Greek Cypriots, it was a revolutionary war 
against the cruel and oppressive dominance of Great Britain, which was not directed 
against the Turkish Cypriot population. The bulk of Greek literature123 on the subject 
applauds the revolutionary struggle and presents the EOKA fighters as heroes of the 
revolution. It shows how popular the struggle was in the Greek-Cypriot community and 
how brutally the young fighters were killed by the British, but nothing is said against the 
Turkish Cypriots. Being in the minority, they were not expected to block the revolution.  
However, by the time the Turkish state became embroiled in the Greek 
revolution, the meaning of the term “minority” had changed. It had come to mean a “self-
determination” movement. While this transformation did not change relations between 
the two communities, it did justify and provide an ideology that the two terrorist groups, 
EOKA B and TMT, could use to recruit and operate. Nonetheless, the groups found little 
support for their cruel ambitions, for fewer than 300124 men joined from each 
community. In explaining the ethnic conflict, many writers identity the Greek- and 
Turkish-Cypriots’ passion as a fierce determination by both communities to join Cyprus 
with their motherlands, Greece and Turkey. We find this argument reasonable, but it does 
not affect the analysis of the conflict presented here. As we have said, the ethnic 
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dimension was a natural element that reflected both communities’ inherent ethnic 
orientation. The Greek-Cypriot struggle for enosis with Greece was a reaction to their 
perception of a threat from Turkey’s expansionism. If carried over into Cyprus, that 
would make the Greek Cypriots the “minority” and position them against fifty million 
Turks, instead of 120,000 Turkish Cypriots.125 The Turkish-Cypriot struggle for taksim 
was also reasonable. It reflected their fear, first, of the UN stipulation of peace in the 
Greek struggle, which raised a serious possibility that the Turkish Cypriots would be 
assimilated. Second, they also feared the military aspect, specifically, an EOKA B coup 
that would expel or destroy them.   
There is one interesting scientific study that uses a complex theoretical 
game – known as “the prisoner’s dilemma”126 – based on psychological and sociological 
theories to analyze the Cyprus crisis. The study was published just three months before 
the Turkish invasion. It comes closer than most to a comprehensive explanation of the 
internal causes of the crisis. The author, Malvern Lumsden, considers the crisis as a 
dynamic changeable situation between two basic democratic principles of an ethnic 
minority group in an ethnic-type conflict: the principle of majority and the principle of 
autonomy. For the study, 185 student teachers from both Cypriot communities were 
asked about four possible results or changes in the conflict. The results are shown in the 
diagram below. The teachers were asked to prioritize their choices according to which 
change or result would made them “feel better.”  
These choices were then processed via changing balancing coefficients of 
the conflict, such as the “possibility of war,” “time extension, “value of war,” and 
“superordinate goal.”  
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Table 1.   The Prisoners' Dilemma Table of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.127 
 
Each of these factors made possible valuable predictions which could offer 
good information to all those who would handle and conduct the crisis. For example, 
increasing the “possibility of war” would push the communities to further persist in their 
efforts for enosis/taksim; “extending the time of the crisis” would create a good 
opportunity to suppress the crisis in favor of their common interests, such as acceptance 
in the EU.  
The study’s conclusions support our removal of the “ethnic-type” label 
from the characterization of the conflict in Cyprus. The “prisoner’s dilemma” experiment 
explains the increased tensions as a result of the misperceptions and mistrust of the Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots that arose after the Turkish-Cypriot population was gathered into 
enclaves. The experiment identifies the conflict itself as a symmetrical conflict of 
interests and an asymmetric conflict of values. The most important element, however, is 
Lumsden’s conclusion regarding the Greek and Turkish Cypriots’ actions and reactions 
to opposing contingencies.  
For the Greek Cypriots at the time, there was little difference between 
enosis and peace. But war was the worst contingency of all and should be avoided at all 
costs. For the Turkish Cypriots, the correlation of peace and taksim was a much different 
situation: war was a better contingency than enosis. Within this perception is a prediction, 
or an interpretation perhaps, of the evolution that would occur in the crisis as it moved 
toward the establishment of the Greek coup in Cyprus and, eventually, the Turkish 
invasion. The fact that the Greek Cypriots, in contrast to the Turkish Cypriots, were 
negative in their reaction to the war scenario reflects the way the dictators in Greece felt 
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compelled to take over the situation in order to overcome the Greek and Greek-Cypriots’ 
reluctance and deter the results of the Turkish Cypriots’ decisiveness. On the other hand, 
this perception impelled the Turkish army to implement its territorial ambitions, 
instigated by Turkish sentiments, and assured that there would be no resistance and 
response from the Greek Cypriots, or the Greeks, by extension. This is not to say that this 
conception conducted to the brutal events, but that a change of balance in considering and 
evaluating war between the communities could easily predict that the crisis would evolve 
toward intervention and conflict on both sides.   
b. Individual Influences 
The leading actors in the Cyprus drama were undoubtedly the leaders of 
the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities, Archbishop Makarios and Rauf Denktash, 
respectively. Makarios, the first and only president of an independent, democratic 
Cyprus, due to his religious affiliation and challenging attitude toward the powerful, 
acquired both fanatical disciples and rivals. Because of the many contradictions 
surrounding his name and the many accusations against him, he shares the same fate in 
history as the ancient Greek general Alcibiades.128  
 
Figure 9.   The Cypriot “Ethnarch” and President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios.129 
 
Given his intelligence, his faith in God, and his confidence in his 
decisions, early in 1950 Makarios became Archbishop. After taking over the reins of 
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Cyprus’s political life, he was proclaimed Ethnarch and became the symbol of enosis to 
the Greek Cypriots. Makarios’s political profile is as democratic as the religion he served. 
He struggled to achieve enosis through legitimate and publicly accepted means, mainly 
trying to obtain international support and recognition by the UN of the Greek-Cypriot 
right of self-determination. Unfortunately for him, the UN organization has no armed 
force of its own, but must rely on the military action of its members.130 The United States 
and the western Europeans, who dominated the UN Security Council and General 
Assembly in the mid-50s, were against the enosis plans. They put an end to Makarios’s 
hopes.131 Recognizing the lack of international support, Makarios compromised, offering 
the idea of an independent, democratic Cyprus. What Makarios meant by independence, 
however, was absolute disengagement from foreign factions. In interviews in both 1964 
and 1974, Makarios132 conceded his opposition to an American settlement, whether 
through NATO or not, his repulsion of the Greek dictators, his sympathy for the Soviets, 
and his fear of the Turkish expansionism, emphasizing his democratic ideals and good 
knowledge of the international scene. His attitude, certainty, and faithfulness to his ideals, 
however, annoyed his many enemies, and his popularity in the Cypriot community was a 
great obstacle to their plans. Some of the Greeks who tried to kill him later accused him, 
and still do, of being a traitor to the Turks, of having asked the Turks to invade in order to 
maintain his power. But his appeal to U.S. President Ford, in which he asked for help to 
defend the Cypriots against the Turkish violations133 and the fact that he was not re-
enthroned by the Turks after the invasion contradict those claims.  
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Makarios tried to compromise with the opposing powers of the bi-natured 
Cypriot society, promoting new and common national prototypes, but he found himself 
exposed to diverse, potent fronts. One was the American–Soviet Cold War, now 
transferred to the Soviet border, very close to the most sensitive American interests. The 
other opposing front was the smaller Greco-Turkish Cold War, which had lasted for 
centuries. Another front comprised the inadequate and fragile democracies in the triangle 
– Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus – which focused their powers of reinforcement on the 
weakest apex of the triangle. At the same time, Makarios’s goal was to establish Cyprus 
as a self-contained state, independent of external bonds. Once that was accomplished, no 
one could influence or benefit from Cyprus’s distinctive strategic location and peculiar 
population in ways contrary to him and his people.    
Rauf Denktash was the official representative of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community and its rights in the newly established constitutional democracy of 1960. At 
the same time, he also led the backstage struggle for taksim, backing the TMT terrorists, 
and creating the necessary provisions for Turkey to invade. As an extension of the 
Turkish plans, Denktash promoted a policy of separatism within the Cypriot community, 
in order to present the crisis as a communal, ethnic-rooted problem and sow dissension 
and terror among the Turks about their fate under the Greek administration.  
This work of division took the form of several bombs aimed at Turkish-
Cypriot targets, causing fear and then feelings of revenge against the Greeks of the island. 
They were meant to provoke a reaction against the democratic integrity of the 
communities and to convince the Turkish Cypriots to gather into enclaves for their own 
safety. According to Kutlu Adali, a Turkish journalist, in 1986 Denktash admitted on 
British television that he had ordered the first bombing against the Press office of the 
Turkish Embassy in Nicosia on June 7, 1958.134 A second bomb was exploded in front of 
Denktash’s law office, and the Greek Cypriots were again declared responsible. On 
September 17, 1962, a shot was fired outside Denkatsh’s office, but again he was absent 
and safe. According to a Turkish history professor, Dr. Fahir Armaoglu, both bombings 
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were blamed on the Greeks, but had been placed by Denktash’s orders in an effort to 
terrify and arouse the Turkish population. A similar thing happened in 1955 at Kemal 
Ataturk’s house in Thessaloniki, which resulted in the destruction of tens of thousands of 
Greek properties, the killing of many, and the expulsion of thousands of others.135  
By March 31, 1964, under Denktash’s orders 9,310 Turkish Cypriots from 
seventeen mixed villages were forced by the TMT to abandon their homes and move into 
enclaves, creating thirty-nine such enclaves in the north for 60 percent of the total 
Turkish population on Cyprus. On June 30, 1975, Denktash threatened to expel any 
Greeks remaining north of the Attila line (the green line) if his demands that all the 
Turkish Cypriots be transported to the area under Turkish troop control were not met.136 
 
 
Figure 10.   The leader of the Turkish-Cypriots Rauf Denktash in 1974.137 
 
We have shown how the distinctive character of the Cypriot society 
affected the relationship between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities. We have 
also shown that the suspicious and prejudiced relations between Greeks and Turks 
created many preconditions that could bring them into conflict. Furthermore, a rival 
predisposition, massive conscription, and psychological pressure can easily drive 
different ethnic groups into conflict. And controversy between ethnic groups pursuing 
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incompatible or mutually exclusive political goals138 was occurring in Cyprus. So it 
would not be wrong to consider the Cyprus crisis as mainly an ethnic crisis before the 
agitations of 1963 which “abolished” the constitution of 1960 and, under some 
preconditions, before the intervention of the Greek coup. 
In our examination of the internal crisis in Cyprus, we have shown, 
however, that despite the existence of many preconditions and predispositions within 
Cypriot society that could have driven the crisis into an ethnic conflict, the circumstances 
and events that led to the Greek military intervention and the Turkish invasion were not 
ethnic in nature. The conflict proved to be one of unvarnished violence against two 
communities that were always merely token participants and that influenced the conflict 
only by their exhaustion and their role as victims.  
D. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: NATO AND THE UN  
As we said earlier, international organizations are not self-contained, free-agent 
entities that can exert influence spontaneously on countries, crises, or agreements. It is up 
to their constituent members to decide whether or not they will use a combined force 
authorized by the organizations’ institutions to settle a disagreement. If the members are 
reluctant to take action and responsibility, the organization cannot act by itself. 
International organizations contributed to the Cyprus conflict by their absence, hesitancy, 
and indifference in securing the unprotected and unsafe democratic state. However, since 
the European Economic Community was structured to deal only with economic relations 
at the time, NATO and the UN cannot be blamed for their detached role during the 
Cyprus crisis.  
1. NATO 
NATO, following the American example, characterized the causes of the conflict 
as “ethnic” and tried to keep a safe distance from it and its conflicted members. NATO’s 
major goal was to maintain peace on the southeastern flank of the alliance, securing by 
that the alliance’s integrity and respect in relation to the Warsaw Pact countries during 
the Cold War era. Regardless of the Cypriot problem, that goal could be achieved as long 
as Greece and Turkey were not fighting. So any approach to the problem by NATO was 
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actually an effort to keep the Mediterranean region calm and nonviolent,139 even if this 
was not a solution to the political and social instability of Cyprus.  
In regard to NATO’s initiative to intervene with a solution, the alliance could not 
take action when its members were reluctant for their own reasons to do so. The United 
States did not want to use NATO to resolve the problem by taking the side of either 
Greece or Turkey, and thus, displeasing the other. Taking one side or the other would 
have affected that country’s future in the alliance and set an example for other intra-
alliance disputes. Great Britain also did not want NATO’s interference because that 
might mean transforming British bases into NATO bases. France, having lost colonies 
around the world that could only be maintained with NATO support, was also negative in 
regard to any NATO mediation or action while, at the same time, being sympathetic140 to 
the Greek position of enosis.  
Greece opposed the NATO peace plan141 of 1964 which provided for the 
deployment of 10,000 troops under NATO and deterred Greece and Turkey from 
intervention during the settlement. This was because the political resolution that would 
succeed the military command was derived from the Acheson Plan and was directed 
toward partition and double enosis. Turkey also, despite its having accepted the Acheson 
Plan as the basis of negotiations, was not happy with the idea of a 10,000-troop presence 
that would constrain its future ambitions to invade. Cyprus rejected the NATO peace plan 
for the same reasons that Greece did and also because Makarios did not want Cyprus to 
be aligned with NATO or to join with any other country or organization. Finally, NATO 
itself did not want to get involved in the Cyprus crisis and risk Soviet complaints, which 
could give rise to further involvement. Thus, it was impossible for NATO to determine 
any resolution for the island. One final aspect that negated the possibility of NATO 
military involvement concerns the democratic process and the island’s future as an 
independent democratic state, which could not be established by force of arms.    
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What can be said about NATO members is that the process followed in Cyprus 
was to first ask for Makarios’s invitation142 before getting involved. Thus, it was not a 
dynamic and decisive intervention as in several other cases. In 1991, the U.S. Senate143 
harshly criticized the American “one law for the rich, one law for the poor” policy that 
favored Turkey’s illegal actions in Cyprus but called for the imposition of strict measures 
on Iraq for the invasion of Kuwait.   
2. The UN 
The UN’s involvement in the course of the Cyprus crisis is left final intentionally, 
in order to ease the process of transiting this study from the research part to critiques, 
assessments over future prospects and conclusions since the United Nations was charged 
with the responsibility to find a remedy. 
In 1964, a few months after the agitation that disrupted the writing of the 
constitution for the now independent Cyprus, the UN decided to deploy UN forces in 
Cyprus (UNFICYP). This force, which was responsible for the security of all Cypriots, 
became the longest-standing peacekeeping force of the United Nations.144 However, the 
UN forces were not welcomed by the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots because it meant 
the end of the Turkish intervention.145 The less than 2,000 deployed troops146 were only 
capable of low-level operations and could not prevent major attacks by either side. While 
it would be wrong hold the UN troops responsible for failing to deter the Greek coup and 
the Turkish invasion, the UN was responsible for the policy put in force following the 
events of the summer of 1974, which continues today.   
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UN Resolution 3212,147 which was approved and signed on 1 November 1974, 
was overtly unfair to Cyprus and its democratic future. In the final draft approved by the 
General Assembly, terms like “Turkey,” “invasion,” “occupation,” and “raid” are absent. 
Moreover, there is no talk about either condemning the Turkish invasion or imposing any 
countermeasures against the intruder. Instead, the two Cypriot communities are called 
upon, as before the invasion, to continue negotiations to find a mutually acceptable 
solution, as if nothing had changed on the island in the last few months.148  
Resolution 3212 does not even raise the issue of Turkey. Instead, it satisfies the 
demands of Turkey and its Western allies by not asking for military countermeasures. It 
addresses none of Cyprus’s needs or problems. The Eastern Bloc countries were satisfied 
with the structure and terminology of the text because it required all the armies to 
withdraw, thereby effectively demilitarizing the island. It also called for the removal of 
the British military bases and a weakening of NATO’s influence in the area. For the same 
reasons, the resolution was supported by members of the Non-aligned Movement, 
because the text accented the nonaligned nature of Cyprus, instead of its engagement with 
either Greece and Turkey or any other international organization. For the first time in 
global history, a state was identified as belonging to a particular international 
environment – the nonaligned one – before its government and people had even 
expressed an opinion.149  
The resolution was censured by the Greek-Cypriot community because the term 
“equality,” according to which the negotiations were structured, equalized politically and 
institutionally the two Cypriot communities as if they were equal in numbers. Finally, the 
United Nations’s presence in Cyprus, by securing a buffer zone across the 112-mile green 
line and peace between the communities, achieved only quiescence to and postponement 
of attempts to find a solution.150 
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V. ASSESSING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
A. THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
The conflict in Cyprus occurred within a context of significant international 
interventionism, always in favor of interests foreign to Cyprus. The international system 
failed both to resolve the crisis before it took on international dimensions and to reach a 
compromise afterward among the multiple opposing forces. From 1955 on, the 
international community had had multiple opportunities to solve the Cyprus problem. 
During the early years, the interested foreign governments failed to evaluate the crisis’s 
significance, and thus, lost the opportunity to settle the situation at a time when one of the 
parties was indifferent and the other was not yet fully engaged. Other failures include the 
creation in 1960 of an unworkable constitution for Cyprus and the involvement of 
dangerous players in the game.  
During the eleven years after the constitution’s collapse in 1963, members of the 
international community consulted and compromised, eventually forcing the Greek 
Cypriot president to make concessions. As a result, what had been enemies became 
opposing sides. It also changed the nature of the playing field, giving total freedom of 
action to Greece and Turkey to control the situation by a display of force. The 
international system’s failure to cure the thirty-two-year-old long-suffering Cyprus and 
reunite its divided land and people is a weakness that continues today. Unfortunately, as 
long as the international community continues to make the mistakes of the past and 
searches for a solution that reconciles Greece and Turkey, but not the Cypriots, the issues 
will remain unresolved.  
The international system did not deter the crisis in Cyprus from ending in conflict, 
because it was asymmetrical in nature. The balance of power that adjusts international 
relations between countries and system has an incompatible attribute, a two-speed 
adaptability on any scale change of balances. This means that many times the 
international system indicates quite flexible capabilities to fit and accept a status change 
inside its range, while simultaneously being unable to permit and accommodate other  
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changes or the same changes in a small sequence of time. The Cyprus crisis in particular 
encountered both the international system’s flexible and its inflexible process of 
acceptance. 
At first it was the awkwardness of the international system to take on the 
revolutionary tendency of the Greek Cypriots to attempt enosis and, later, nonaligned 
independence, which endangered the fragile stability in the sensitive southeastern 
Mediterranean. Kissinger and other Western leaders viewed Cyprus in the same way that 
the Austro-Hungarian Metternich and the British Castlereagh viewed the 1821 Greek 
insurrection against the Ottomans. In their view, the Greek revolution opposed their own 
efforts to reconstitute the European balance of power and establish safe nation-state 
associations against the liberal and revolutionary currents of the post-Napoleon era. 
Indeed, in both eras, the background threat was the Russian finger which backed the 
subversive elements and challenged the status quo. The Western bloc led by Kissinger 
considered Cyprus and its independent-minded president, Makarios, as a threat to the 
stability of the North Atlantic Alliance. “But neither Metternich nor Kissinger nor the 
Cold War architects made room in their policies for the politics of change and 
redistribution that were at work in their respective areas.”151 
After the crisis escalated, however, the international system of balances adopted 
the flexibility of Realpolitik which adjusts antagonisms and conflicts according to the 
current balance of power. “Realpolitik solves international problems based on the 
existing distribution of power rather than on a sense of international right and justice.”152 
Thus, international relations followed the mandates of realism instead of the 
emotionalism that the right of self-determination emitted. Hence Cyprus became the prey 
of the international scene which shifted to “expedient rather than principled behavior.”  
According to Realpolitik, peace is a result of a “decisive imbalance of power.” 
But in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey were chasing with equal possibilities, according to 
their history, dominance against each other. The international factor taught the Cypriots 
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how fragile power balances or even alliances are when confronted with Realpolitik 
interests. Because of their historical and common religious bonds, Makarios invested in 
the Russian factor, forgetting how constrained those had become under communist 
dominance. Communism is a nonreligious theory of life; Greece was under the American 
democratic influence. Makarios also failed to understand that with the culmination of the 
Cuban crisis, the Cold War was slanted toward the Americans, awaiting the Soviet 
Union’s collapse. It would have been unwise and contrary to its own contemporary 
interests for anyone to go against the Western powers and have faith in a dynamic Soviet 
intervention.  
Hence, naturally, the crisis in Cyprus followed a Realpolitik course and favored 
Turkey’s ambitions which were (and still are) substantially for a better strategic position 
and economic and business opportunities. This is typically the course that high-intensity 
and wide-ranging crises usually follow. When those relax, the international system of 
balances shifts back into principled behavior. Using the logic of Realpolitik and 
connecting all the links in the chain and pieces of the puzzle, we get a clear picture of the 
Cyprus conflict that also corresponds to conspiracy theories. In order to separate 
ourselves from emotional and prejudiced assumptions and to find a dispassionate, rational 
solution to the problem, it is important to also separate the events from conspiracy 
theories.   
The American secret services did not plan the Turkish invasion, nor was it 
ordered by Henry Kissinger. No documents have been found or are going to be found to 
prove those theories. A consecutive sequence of events, influenced by external factors, 
drove the crisis along a no-way-back course having few opportunities to avoid conflict. 
The responsibilities of the Americans were discussed in the previous chapter. There was 
probably no secret plan that established either the 1967 military coup in Greece or the 
1974 Turkish plans for division. In fact, the American side adversely affected democratic 
rule in Greece, because it expected to give power to the anti-American Central Union in 
the elections of 1964 by easing the army’s intervention, even if conflict broke out in a 
different way. The Greek colonels, ambitious for Cypriot self-determination and 
receiving important political support as a government from the United States, tried to 
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annex Cyprus by force. That cannot be considered a Greek intervention, since the 
colonels had no legitimate authority from either the government or the Greek people. For 
Turkey, whose plans to divide Cyprus were well known by the United States, the 
colonels’ intervention as an excuse to go ahead with the invasion. As we have said, the 
only things America was interested in were keeping the invasion under control, securing 
peace in the region, and maintaining the integrity of NATO’s southeastern flank. The 
Soviet-Turkish rapprochement justified the American compliance in the Turkish plans as 
a Turkish attempt to blackmail the United States. From immediately after the invasion 
until today, the international community, including the United States, has tried to protect 
the resulting insecure peace, searching politically and diplomatically for a way to 
compromise. The bloody events of 1996, in which two Greek Cypriot civilians were 
killed by Turkish Cypriot civilians, prove how unsafe the peace accomplished by the 
Turkish invasion really is. In the long run, the invasion damaged the cause of the Turkish 
Cypriots more than it benefited Turkey.   
B. CONSEQUENCES OF THE MILITARY VIOLENCE 
The diplomatic victory that the Turks achieved by the 1960 London agreement, 
which gave Turkey the legal right to intervene in Cyprus whenever they judged that the 
Turkish Cypriots’ security was threatened, offered them a good chance to invade if a 
sufficient opportunity should arise. Thus, in August 1974, Turkish troops invaded 
Cyprus, capturing the northern 37 percent of the island and creating the desired 
autonomous territory for the Turkish Cypriots. The transference of the Greek Cypriot 
population to the south that followed created an almost ethically pure and safe region, 
and, more important, disentangled the dispersed Turkish population from the burden and 
imposition of the dominant and rich Greek Cypriots. As a result, Turkey could exert a 
direct political influence on and had military access to the territory. Thus, it could exert 
stronger pressure on the Greek Cypriot community. In sum, the invasion brought internal 
political benefits to leaders of Turkey, increased the Turkish Cypriots’ power as a 
political entity, and strengthened Turkey’s bargaining position at the UN. Hence, Turkey 
gained political, strategic, and bargaining benefits from the invasion.  
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In the long run, however, those benefits would prove inadequate and even 
damaging for both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. Denktash’s declaration on 
December 15, 1983, of the occupied territory as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
did not go over well anywhere in the world except Turkey. And since the invasion, the 
Turkish Cypriots have been isolated from the international community, imprisoned by the 
Turkish army. An economic embargo imposed by the EEC impoverished them even more 
at a time when the Greek-Cypriot community was enjoying an economic heyday. Indeed, 
after the invasion the economic growth of the Greek Cypriot economy was explosive. 
Since 1974, the Gross National Product per capita has increased more than 1000 percent, 
to $15,000,153 and the number of tourists visiting free Cyprus per year has exceeded the 
island’s population five times over, reaching 2,696,700 in 2001.154 In contrast, the 
monthly income of the Turkish Cypriots, from being ten times lower, has managed in 
thirty years only to double. As a result, many thousands of Turkish Cypriots have 
emigrated and the Turkish government has sent colonists from eastern Turkey to resettle 
the evacuated Greek-Cypriot properties.155  
But the Turkish Cypriot community’s greatest loss after the invasion was its legal 
right to self-determination and autonomy. The violence of 1974 and the persisting illegal 
occupation of northern Cyprus by Turkish troops abrogated the rights of the Turkish 
community, not because it was responsible for the invasion, but because the law of arms 
replaced international law and controlled their property. International law is theoretical; it 
becomes meaningful only when a governing body accepts it and authorizes its 
implementation. Not only did the invasion not make the Turkish Cypriot community’s 
life better, it eliminated any psychological support for its rights that it might have had 
from the international system. The imposition of arms brought the Turkish Cypriots a 
terrible fate: it made them citizens of a nonstate. In other words, in 1974, the Turkish 
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army imprisoned the Turkish Cypriots on the island where they are now ignored by the 
European Union. In 2004, the EU, which recognizes the Greek Cypriot government as the 
only legal and representative government on the island, accepted Cyprus as a member of 
the European family, leaving the Turkish Cypriots abandoned to their fate under military 
law.  
Despite the doubtful and distant possibility of Turkey becoming a member, the 
Turkish-Cypriots might have been brought into the European Union along with the Greek 
Cypriots. But they failed to make the necessary concessions after the invasion to 
“maintain the conquests of 1974,” just as the Greek Cypriots had failed to make 
concessions regarding the Turkish-Cypriot question between 1964 and 1974, which drove 
the crisis in Cyprus to the brink.    
In any event, Turkey threatened the European Union that it would annex the 
northern part, or even the whole island, if Cyprus was accepted as a member. Its threat 
was unsuccessful because the Turkish Cypriots did not want to be assimilated by Turkey 
since that would not have improved their position.156 Moreover, any additional 
confrontation would further harm the already damaged image of Turkish diplomacy and 
might destroy forever Turkey’s dream of European membership.  
The greater irony in the Cyprus conflict is that since the invasion the terms and 
positions of all sides have been turned upside down. Since 2004, as a full member of the 
EU, Cyprus can veto Turkey’s candidacy at any time unless Turkey withdraws its troops. 
Cyprus can also freeze any economic assistance for Turkey and deny the revocation of 
the Turkish Cypriots’ economic isolation. Cyprus can do this because, since the summer 
of 1974 when it lost people, peace, a democratic constitution, and its territorial integrity, 
it has nothing more to lose.  
Thirty years after the dispersion of violence, in the summer of 2004, the Greek 
Cypriots denied the Turkish population its dream of joining the European Union by 
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voting NO to a UN plan. The plan sustained separatism by simply making small 
differentiations in the current buffer zones and maintained the climate of suspicion and 
ethnic rivalry created by the green line. The Greek Cypriots’ denial, however, was not 
really directed at the Turkish Cypriots, but at Turkey. It was intended to demonstrate the 
Cypriot government’s improved bargaining position. Furthermore, the reciprocal peaceful 
feelings of the two communities were reaffirmed when, after Denktash’s “few hours” 
permission in April 2004, many Greek Cypriots visited their abandoned properties in the 
occupied zone. The Cypriot government, knowing that Turkey has no other choice if it 
wants to join the EU, is going to set a high price on its veto power. It will try to turn back 
the clock thirty-two years and avert the deadlock and accomplished facts of the invasion. 
As James Callaghan, the British minister of foreign affairs, predicted in 1974 to his 
Turkish counterpart during the second phase of the Geneva talks, “today Cyprus may be a 
hostage of your army, but later your army will be Cyprus’s hostage.”157 
C. CRITIQUE OF THE UN PLAN 
On March 31, 2004, the United Nations completed the last of five plans drafted 
since 1974 in an effort to find the much desired compromise solution to the Cyprus 
conflict. This plan, commonly known as the Kofi Annan Plan,158 the most well-wrought 
of the five plans, was unsuccessful. On April 24, 2004, it was rejected by the Greek 
Cypriot people with a 78-percent vote against. Since they considered it the best one yet, 
the engineers and mediators of the plan could not hide their disappointment and 
pessimism after its rejection. And some did not hesitate to express publicly that they felt 
betrayed by the Cypriot government that disapproved it, leaving no hope or chance of a 
solution to the problem.  
The plan, however, though very descriptive and analytical, failed to guarantee the 
island’s security. Like previous plans, it treated the problem like an ethnic conflict, and 
thus, simply duplicated past mistakes that should not have been repeated. We derived this 
assumption, that the United Nations treated the Cyprus crisis like an ethnic conflict, from 
the fact that the mediations failed to seek the island’s demographic and territorial 
                                                 
157 Chatzianastasiou, “Cyprus and Change-over,” 139.  
158 UN, Annan Plan. http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdf. (May 2007). 
 82
integration. Rather, they settled for a peaceful, acceptable, institutionalized division, as if 
the division had been caused by the two communities’ reciprocal hate; as if they had 
asked for the intervention of a Greek coup and a Turkish invasion; as if both 
communities, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, had gambled with their 
properties and their futures in an international chess game. Page seven of the plan 
evidences that separatism: “The status and relationship of the United Cyprus Republic, its 
federal government, and its constituent states is modeled on the status and relationship of 
Switzerland, its federal government, and its cantons.”159 
UN Resolution 3212 did not condemn the Turkish invasion and did not assign 
countermeasures against Turkey. All the plans were oriented to compromise the Greco-
Turkish rivalry and put pressure on the Cypriot representatives, instead of asking the 
Cypriot people. Thus, they impugn the United Nations’ credibility and decisiveness. 
While it would be wrong to judge so overtly the many years and the many pages of work 
in a few lines, the United Nations’ persistence in considering solutions that maintained 
separatism and its acceptance of the accomplished facts of the invasion are questionable, 
if not damning, factors.  
The United Nations failed to find a solution to the Cyprus problem because, like 
the main international participants, it considered the crisis an ethnic dispute and ignored 
the determinative influence of external factors. The United Nations failed because it 
mistakenly believed that the conflict would be instantly resolved once a detailed legal and 
political document was agreed to and signed by the conflicted parties.160 The United 
Nations failed because it mistakenly thought the Cypriots were exhausted in the pursuit 
of their right to freedom and independence after thirty-two weary years of negotiations. 
The United Nations failed because, even with the fifth plan, it tried to mislead the Cypriot 
population again to the tragic agreement of 1960, despite its insubstantial modifications. 
The term “Cypriot population” includes equally the Turkish Cypriots because even if 
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they voted for the plan in the summer of 2004, their seemingly endless international, 
economic, and political isolation weighed heavier on them than the unfair and unsafe 
plan.  
In addition, like the 1960 Constitution, the fifth UN plan granted special rights to 
Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain: 
This Agreement shall enter into force upon approval by each side at 
separate simultaneous referenda conducted in accordance with the 
Agreement and the signature by Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom 
of the Treaty on matters related to the new state of affairs in Cyprus.161 
Why should this plan offer a legitimized right and argument to any country, after 
its invasion and annexation of the whole of Cyprus, at a postwar negotiations table? The 
Greek Cypriots rejected directly any opening of a door that would give rise again to 
foreign intervention in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots also would not have approved any 
foreign intervention that, like the last one, deprived them of their freedom and rights. 
However, for them, the Annan Plan was their only chance of escape from isolation.  
The UN plan dedicates a whole chapter to the balance of power between the 
interested foreign parties: “Treaty between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom Related to the New State of Affairs in Cyprus.”162 It also provides for the 
demilitarization of the island and the gradual withdrawal of all Greek and Turkish forces. 
But before that process could be accomplished, the plan, inspired again by the disastrous 
London agreement, stipulated a three-year presence of armies of both sides: “the Greek 
contingent not to exceed 950, all ranks, and the Turkish contingent not to exceed 650, all 
ranks; thereafter, subject to a  three-year review with the objective of total 
withdrawal.”163 
The great irony is that the three years following the London agreement, 1960 to 
1963, were enough to break down peace and democracy in Cyprus despite the presence 
of 950 and 650 troops, respectively, and a few thousand UN Blue Helmets. And yet, the 
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UN secured through the plan close to a million lives, again trusting the same numbers and 
analogies, as if everything had worked out successfully back then. The next question is, 
who, how, and under what attribute will someone use the guns that the United Nations 
allowed in Cyprus for each state? In particular, how can an island be considered 
demilitarized when it has 50 battle tanks, 180 infantry vehicles, 18 towed artillery pieces, 
18 air defense missiles, 6 transport helicopters, 4 light helicopters, 16 air defense 
canons,164 and other military equipment for each constituent state?  
The related proposals tend to focus Greek Cypriot fears on foreign intervention, 
mainly from Turkey. For as long as the United Nations tries to maintain measures that 
exert influence and satisfy primarily Greek, Turkish, and British interests, the Cypriots 
will disapprove of any proposed solution. Other equally important aspects of the UN plan 
also deterred the Greek Cypriots from approving both it, and probably any future plan 
that would include the same conditions.  
The Cypriot government tried repeatedly to convince the international community 
that the equity between the communities concerned rights and negotiations, not political 
status or populations that were unequal in size and economic status.165 Indeed, the fifth 
plan equalized the communities as political entities. Thus, the Greek Cypriots would 
share the burden of the Turkish Cypriots’ economic depression by the construction of one 
united Federal bank but would support the federal state by providing 75 percent of the 
total taxation. 
Acknowledging each other’s distinct identity and integrity and that our 
relationship is not one of majority and minority but of political equality 
where neither side may claim authority or jurisdiction over the other.166 
Under the same rhetoric: 
The federal government shall be composed of a Council of Ministers of 
six members (three Greek Cypriots, three Turkish Cypriots). Delegates 
from each constituent state parliament shall sit in the transitional federal 
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Parliament (24 Greek Cypriots, 24 Turkish Cypriots) and in the European 
Parliament (four Greek Cypriots, two Turkish Cypriots).167  
Later, the UN plan adjusts the bilateral relationship: “The constituent states are of 
equal status.”168 
The fifth UN plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriots also for economic reasons. 
These concerned the 280,000 Cypriots who had lost their property during the invasion 
and population displacement. Compensation would be offered only to the few thousands 
of those who were dispossessed of property before the entry-into-force date of the fifth 
plan: “In areas subject to territorial adjustment, properties shall be reinstated to 
dispossessed owners.”169 Even worse, the compensations would represent only a small 
percentage of the property’s actual worth: “Dispossessed owners who opt for 
compensation, as well as institutions, shall receive full and effective compensation for 
their property on the basis of value at the time of dispossession adjusted to reflect 
appreciation of property values in comparable locations.”170    
However, what was most important to the Cypriot government was to keep the 
bargaining advantage inherent in its becoming a member of the European Union. This 
was the only chance Cyprus would have to counterbalance the advantage that the 
accomplished facts offered Turkey and to press for a fair solution that would include 
withdrawal of troops. The fifth plan obligated Cyprus, however, to presign the Turkish 
candidacy as a sort of “blank check.” 
Cyprus shall maintain special ties of friendship with Greece and Turkey, 
respecting the balance in Cyprus established by the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of 
Alliance and this Agreement, and as a European Union member state shall support the 
accession of Turkey to the Union. 
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Going back to the “ethnic conflict” issue, the UN, through the fifth plan, shows it 
believes the solution is to maintain separatism on the island. The division of the island is 
being institutionalized by a dividing line that separates the constituent parts of the federal 
state. The plan would change the dividing line from today’s green line and allow each of 
the states access to more land, but neither of the constituent states would be able to gain 
back their lost property or buy property from the other state. As we said before, 
compensation will be given only to areas affected by territorial adjustments; no one else 
will be allowed to live in and own property in the other constituent state. 
[T]he application of restrictions, on a non-discriminatory basis, on the 
right of natural persons in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, and of 
legal persons, to purchase immovable property in the Turkish Cypriot 
constituent state without permission of the competent authority of that 
constituent state, for fifteen years or for as long as the gross domestic 
product per capita in that constituent state does not reach the level of 85% 
of the gross domestic product per capita in the Greek Cypriot state, 
whichever is the earlier, shall not be precluded.171  
And several lines later: 
[T]he application of restrictions, on a non-discriminatory basis, on the 
right of a Cypriot citizen to reside in a constituent state of which he does 
not hold the internal constituent state citizenship status shall not be 
precluded, if the percentage of such residents of the total population of a 





12% between the 10th
 
and 14th years following the date of entry into force 
of this Act.172  
These limitations will affect all Cypriots, but only the Greek Cypriots can afford 
to invest or even to repurchase their properties in the north. The plan is intended to 
maintain the island’s demography as it was configured after the invasion and the 
population relocations. In order to secure the uniformity of the constituent states, 
however, in the fifth plan the United Nations restricts the people of both states from 
residing in or reclaiming properties in the other constituent state. The persisting 
separatism authorized by such a plan would create two autonomous but ethnically and 
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religiously separate states. In other words, the UN plan, in effect, would move the borders 
of Greece to South Nicosia and the borders of Turkey to North Nicosia, giving a sense of 
double enosis with autonomous districts in Cyprus. The nonsensical modification of the 
current green line is just a diplomatic trick to win the Cyprus government’s acceptance. 
The maps below show the line of division as it is today and as it will be after the 
acceptance of the fifth UN plan. The division is obvious; the territorial changes make no 
sense.  
D. CYPRUS TODAY 
 
 
Figure 11.   Map of Cyprus Today.173 
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Figure 12.   Cyprus after the UN Plan’s Entry into Force174  
 
Establishing a Turkish state beside a Greek state, without buffer zones and 
without also trying to ease the ethnic rivalry and acknowledge the recent gory past, would 
be an immature and dangerous decision. Furthermore, the events in Derinya in the 
summer of 1996 indicate that the wounds of the invasion have not healed. This is because 
the application of restrictions cannot prevent an owner who was dispossessed during the 
invasion from using violence against those who expelled him from property inherited 
from his father. The UN initiative to add a blue stripe for Greek Cypriots and a red stripe 
for Turkish Cypriots to the current Cyprus flag175 indicates an intention to denote a 
secured marriage of two different ethnic entities. 
The United Nations, intending to recognize and institutionalize the existence of 
two distinct ethnic entities and emphasize the survival of the Turkish Cypriots, created a 
plan that promotes the ethnic dimensions and imposes the populations’ separation into 
two secure sectors. The United Nations and the international system in general fails to  
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understand that the Greco-Turkish problem began at the time the populace was divided, 
since the two communities not only had many things in common to divide – land, the 
military, trade – but also a long history of coexistence.  
Even the protectionist character of the plan in regard to the rights of minorities in 
the constituent states emphasizes the separatism inside the states, by calling on them to 
live in different villages rather than peacefully accepting the differences. “Greek Cypriots 
and Turkish Cypriots living in specified villages in the other constituent state shall enjoy 
cultural, religious and educational rights and shall be represented in the constituent state 
legislature.”176 A document and a regulation cannot protect Cyprus’s minorities, but 
assimilation can 
The United Nations made two major mistakes in considering its solution to the 
Cyprus conflict. First, it ignored the persisting interventionism that maintains Cyprus’s 
connection to Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain. That interrelationship distorts the 
democratic character of the federal state and endangers once more the island’s territorial 
integrity. Second, the UN ignored the persisting separatism which maintains the division 
of the island, enhancing the ethnic and religious differences and propagating feelings of 
distrust and prejudice. 
The United Nations tried to establish safety for both regimes and secure reciprocal 
respect by imposing separatism. Respect for the different however cannot be ordered or 
assured; it must be inspired. The region cannot be protected from ethnic or religious 
friction if the populations live apart from one another or are segregated in enclaves. Only 
their social assimilation can defeat distrust, vengefulness, and prejudice by transferring 
the struggle to individual small groups, instead of large groups whether national or 
religious. This concept for a solution, is presented in the next and final chapter, the thesis 
conclusion.  
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VI. CONCLUSION-FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR A SOLUTION IN 
CYPRUS 
This study has tried through its chapters, analyzing one by one the related factors, 
to demonstrate the importance and influence of foreign interests’ interventionism in 
Cyprus. It has also tried to distinguish this conflict from those generally labeled “ethnic 
conflicts” and to disconnect the ethnic-related influences from the highly determinative 
actors that conducted the crisis toward a division of the island. Regardless of whether the 
Cyprus conflict was an ethnic conflict or not, we are nonetheless certain that today’s 
problems are synonymous with the division of the island. We believe further that this 
division is not a result of ethnic antipathy, but of its imposition after the Turkish invasion. 
In other words, even if ethnic dimensions were crucial during the generation of the crisis, 
the evolution and final result of the crisis came from the atrocious violence of the terror 
groups and the foreign national armies.   
We saw that the United Nations’ efforts to find a satisfactory solution were based 
on theories applicable to ethnic conflicts. All of the UN plans indicate the hesitant 
disposition of that organization and, by extension, the reluctance of the international 
system to assert a radical and decisive solution that would eliminate the problem rather 
than just compromise with and gain compliance from the opposing parties.   
This study concludes by outlining a radical and risky plan that could bring a 
credible and feasible solution to the Cyprus problem. The plan is based on the theory that 
the crisis was not an ethnic conflict. It assumes that the Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot communities can co-exist in mutual respect and according to peaceful 
agreements.  
The plan also imagines a new form of modern liberal democracy based on the 
philosophy of the free-market economy. Just as the free-market economy abrogates price 
restrictions and eliminates the control of the central state in consolidating partial 
economies and ignoring ethnic, religious, social, and even political distinctiveness, this 
new plan abrogates the lines of division and ethnic backgrounds and intends to assimilate 
the separate communities into one integrated state. Greek and Turkish Cypriots become 
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members of a united state with equal rights and responsibilities as individuals, regardless 
of their ethnic identity. Qualifications, credentials, studies, and objective studies will be 
the fundamental criteria for structuring the new state and new society, again regardless of 
national derivation. A scientific committee, supported and nominated by the international 
scientific community and comprised of those who embrace the ideals of integration of 
diverging nationalities will decide the details and appraisals. 
The population will be encouraged and subsidized to resettle and invest freely in 
the admixture of peoples in order to create areas of indistinct ethnicity. Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot property owners, who were dispossessed during the invasion and 
transportation, will be able to return to their properties. And the new Cypriot government, 
along with the EU, will be responsible for compensating those whose properties were 
captured with new ones. In this way, the Greek Cypriots will be satisfied morally and the 
Turkish Cypriots economically, since their properties in the south have multiplied in 
value since 1974.   
The administration of this state will be assigned to a political party that will 
consist of delegates elected from the mixed-population regions. So the government will 
be a mixture of both Greek and Turkish Cypriot political representatives, according to the 
results of simultaneous local elections, regardless of ethnic participation percentages. The 
Constitution and other official government documents will be written in both Turkish and 
Greek and will not include articles distinguishing Greek Cypriots from Turkish Cypriots. 
All the detailed decisions, mandates, and rights will concern all citizens equally. The 
public administration will be based on the same structure and consist of mixed-ethnicity 
members with no determining percentages. New appointments will be adjusted according 
to a general list of qualifications, whether this creates a public sector comprised of 2 
percent or 80 percent Turkish Cypriots. The current advantage of the Greek Cypriots will 
be a future challenge to the Turkish Cypriots to reverse this trend. This will not lead to 
any kind of dangerous of dominant authority of one group or the other, however, because 
competition will be among individuals, not social or ethnic groups.  
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An integrated Cyprus that includes northern Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots as a full 
member of the European Union, will enjoy the total protection and economic support of 
Europe. The European Union, through the European Security and Defense Policy 
organization, will take over Cyprus’s initial demilitarization. They will replace the UN, 
Greek, and Turkish forces with European, Greek Cypriot, and Turkish Cypriot troops 
under an ESDP command which will be responsible for the Cypriot troops’ training. 
Thus, the plan is intended for the future to create a solid Cypriot army, of both Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots, of about 10,000 troops. This force will be sufficient to protect the 
island’s integrity from external threats in this sensitive geographic area, but will remain 
under the ESDP’s short- or long-term command. All its arms and military supplies will 
be controlled by the ESDP even after the island becomes self-sufficient in providing 
protection. The plan provides for the transformation of the British bases into 
ESPD/NATO bases with built-in flexibility for further transformation under other 
Cyprus-generated agreements.    
The state we envision will have two official languages, Greek and Turkish, which 
will be taught in all schools, which will be mixed, since this is considered the most 
difficult part of the plan, at least during its first years of implementation. It will be very 
difficult to create a common and mutual understanding between those who have been 
taught for thirty-two years that they are enemies. Nonetheless, a common currency, 
market, political ideology and direction, mutual interests, and coexistence are 
fundamental and promising elements for a homogeneous society. A Cypriot Cyprus is not 
an inspiration that intends to eliminate any national element of the general population or 
to uproot the emotional and historical bonds with the ethnic motherlands. It is not a plan 
that asks Cypriots to deny their origins, but to see this settlement as a natural culmination 
of their long-time coexistence.  
Furthermore, history cannot be erased nor pain forgotten. Both Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot civilians have suffered grievously from foreign interventions and lost loved ones. 
However, a Cypriot Cyprus calls both communities to use their mutually painful past as a 
lever to a new mutually beneficial future. With wise political leadership, mistakes of the 
past can become ideals of togetherness. Most important, however, no plan should 
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sacrifice territorial integrity for self-determination. Democratic principles and the 
deliverance from ethnic, religious, and social discrimination may prove strong enough to 
reorientate any opposing self-determination processes toward more-common values and a 
pattern of parallel self-determination.  
Our plan is designed to compensate for the weaknesses of the UN plan which 
denies freeing Cyprus from its dependence on Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain and 
protecting the island from definitive division. Part one of the plan depends on the 
decisiveness of the international community in trusting in the survivability and health of 
Cyprus’s economy and the European Union’s political and economic support. For this 
reason the plan will seek verification and acceptance directly from the Cypriot people. It 
bypasses the Greek, Turkish, and British leadership, so as to avoid negotiations with 
indirect benefits, and the obsolete and prejudiced political powers in Cyprus, searching 
through referendum for support directly from all segments of the populace.  
Part two of the plan depends on the willingness of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
communities to exceed their past efforts and defeat the separatist forces that are driven by 
internal passions and external influences. It also depends on their willingness to develop 
and maintain basic common principles, interests, ideas, psychologies, and goals. The 
study is confident that this approach can be successful because it is grounded in the 
circumstances that existed at the onset of the crisis. The generation of the Greek 
Cypriots’ idea of enosis was not a result of anti-Turkish feelings, but rather a reaction to 
the grueling British administration. In fact, until the first propaganda offensives of the 
British and Turkish conspiracy, the two Cypriot communities’ shared sentiments of 
oppression actually brought them closer together.  
Subsequently, the Turkish Cypriots fought against enosis and in favor of taksim. 
This was a more or less typical reaction for an ethnic group living in a foreign state. Since 
the invasion, the Greek Cypriots have attained significant economic progress and 
succeeded, from a European perspective, in showing a mature willingness to enter into a 
mutual, reciprocal, and transnational interdependence and to be assimilated into the 
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global culture.177 The Turkish Cypriots, by voting in favor of the UN plan, rid themselves 
of their shortsighted and ethnically arrant leader, Rauf Denktash, manifesting for a first 
time democratic ideals and their desperation to be freed from the imposition of the arms 
sanctions. 
The road toward integration is long and fanatical nationalistic groups on both 
sides continue to exploit the no-solution situation and benefit from the perpetuation of 
injustice. However, the new state must not submit to the demands of unstable entities that 
may endanger Cyprus’s future security.178 Both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots 
recognize the importance of integration because both have been betrayed by the ideals of 
nationalism generated by their motherlands. They now believe that endorsing nationalism 
would only make them minorities within their own land and country.   
The political and social unification and integration of the island is of a risky 
proposition. But enduring problems such as Cyprus may necessitate radical plans. The 
degree of risk could be decreased, however, by a simultaneous improvement in Greco-
Turkish relations and the continuous and dynamic support of the EU, the UN, and 
NATO.  
Since April of 2004, Cyprus’s great, tempestuous journey, which began thousands 
of years ago, has followed a European course, waiting for the island’s Turkish population 
to find a safe solution to the Cyprus problem. Inspired by John L. Scherer’s book, 
Blocking the Sun: The Cyprus Conflict, we view this journey like Homer’s Odyssey: the 
long return trip of Odysseus, imposed by the ancient Greek gods as a punishment for his 
participation in the conquest of Troy. That odyssey ended only when the gods mercifully 
and justly ended Odysseus’s enchantment in response to his endurance and survival of 
many trials and tribulations. Similarly, after being bedeviled by foreign and greater 
powers, Cyprus deserves mercy, justice, and a fair wind to find its way back to Ithaca, 
where its people can live peacefully and happily ever after.  
 
                                                 
177 Richmond Oliver P., Ethno-nationalism, Sovereignty, and Negotiating Positions in the Cyprus 
Conflict: Obstacles to a Settlement (London, July 1999), an Internet report. 















































Figure 13.   Copy of Makarios' message to the American President Ford.179 
 
 
                                                 
179 Naval Postgraduate School, Declassified Documents Reference System, 
http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS;jsessionid=6F54449A87179A03F54547CF42CBC6AA?locID=












Figure 14.   Copy of the American denial to the Turkish ambitions.180 
                                                 
180 Naval Postgraduate School, Declassified Documents Reference System, 
http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS;jsessionid=6F54449A87179A03F54547CF42CBC6AA?locID=
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Figure 16.   Copy of the American National Security Council to the U.S. Secretary.182 
                                                 
182 Naval Postgraduate School, Declassified Documents Reference System, 
http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS;jsessionid=6F54449A87179A03F54547CF42CBC6AA?locID=
navalps. (May 2007). 
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